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Abstract
This thesis has established the effects of perceptual load and working memory load 
on the conscious awareness o f an expected task-unrelated stimulus. Participants 
performed a visual search task, in which perceptual load was manipulated, while 
attempting to detect the presence of a meaningless task-unrelated figure, referred to 
as the critical stimulus (CS). The results showed a consistent reduction in CS 
detection rate and detection sensitivity (with no accompanying change in response 
criterion), when the search task was of high perceptual load, compared to a low 
perceptual load condition. Alternative accounts of the results in terms of memory 
failure rather than the absence o f conscious awareness, the differential search task 
reaction times in the low and high conditions of perceptual load, goal-neglect, and 
strategy were ruled out. The effects of perceptual load were generalised to a CS 
presented directly at fixation, while demonstrating that detection performance was 
superior for fixated stimuli than for stimuli in peripheral vision, despite size-scaling 
to account for cortical magnification. Furthermore, the experiments established a 
dissociation between the effect o f perceptual load and the effect of working 
memory load on conscious awareness, and a second dissociation between the effect 
of working memory load on awareness and its effect on distractor interference: 
whereas detection sensitivity and distractor interference were both reduced alike 
under high perceptual load, working memory load led to increased distractor 
interference but had no effect on detection sensitivity. Overall, the results 
generalised perceptual load theory (e.g., Lavie, 1995) to measures of conscious 
perception, and established a contrast between the effect of working memory load 
on awareness and on distractibility.
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Chapter 1
General Introduction
6
1.1 Preface
Although our visual experience of the world appears rich and detailed, it is 
nevertheless a common occurrence that clearly visible events can be overlooked 
when attention is directed elsewhere: a motorcyclist might fail to notice a crucial 
road sign when concentrating intensely on navigating through traffic; a footballer 
waiting at the penalty spot is unlikely to be aware of action in the stands behind the 
goal when faced with a critical penalty shoot-out.
These kinds of examples clearly illustrate the consequence of not paying 
attention. Nevertheless, a debate has raged among psychologists for fifty years over 
whether perception is dependent on attention. With this thesis I aim to contribute to 
this debate by testing the hypothesis that the level of perceptual load in a task 
determines whether task-unrelated stimuli will be registered in conscious 
awareness: whereas tasks of high perceptual load can prevent awareness of task- 
unrelated information, tasks of low perceptual load allow awareness of task- 
unrelated information in addition to that of the task itself. This hypothesis stems 
from the perceptual load theory of attention; however, previous tests of the theory 
have typically relied on indirect measures of the perception of task-unrelated 
stimuli, such as neural activity or the effect of their presence on task reaction time. 
Direct measures, i.e., those involving conscious awareness, have been used in only 
one study.
I begin this introductory chapter with a review of evidence from the 
selective attention literature, illustrating the debate between early and late selection 
views regarding whether attention determines conscious perception. I continue by 
outlining a possible resolution to this debate in the form of the perceptual load
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model and reviewing the supporting evidence. Finally, I describe and justify the 
methodology I have employed, a short summary of which follows.
The experiments in this thesis were designed to alleviate the confounds that 
have long been associated with the inattentional blindness paradigm. In doing so, 
they provide a more thorough test of the effects of perceptual load on conscious 
perception. Furthermore, the experimental design allowed the use of detection 
sensitivity (d  ’) as a measure of conscious perception. The experiments described in 
the following chapters demonstrate the phenomenon I have termed Toad induced 
blindness’, and examine the effects of various factors, in addition to perceptual 
load, including task priority, probability of occurrence, location uncertainty, 
strategy, retinal location and working memory load.
1.2 Early versus Late Selection
Do we perceive events to which we are not paying attention? Although this 
question is fundamental to understanding the relationship between attention and 
perception, the answer has remained elusive during a half century of research, 
during which time two contrasting theories have emerged: proponents of ‘early 
selection’ suggest that selective attention occurs early on in the perceptive process 
and therefore perception is limited to what is attended (e.g., Broadbent, 1958; 
Treisman, 1960, 1969); on the other side of the debate, Tate selection’ theorists 
propose that perception of everything in the field of vision proceeds automatically, 
independent of attention, and that selective attention occurs afterwards, only 
affecting higher level processes such as response selection and memory (e.g., 
Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963; Driver & Tipper, 1989; Norman, 1968; Tipper, 1985). A
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resolution to this debate has proved elusive, since both sides have been able to 
draw upon a considerable amount of empirical evidence.
1.2.1 Dichotic Listening Experiments
Participants are typically asked to attend to one of two auditory channels of 
information selected on the basis of physical properties, such as the ear to which it 
is presented or the gender of the voice. For example, a stream of words presented to 
one ear is spoken aloud (shadowed) while a second stream of words presented to 
the other ear is ignored (e.g., Cherry, 1953). Participants recall very little of the 
unattended stream except for particularly salient words such as the participant’s 
name (Moray, 1959), and fail to notice that a certain word was repeated many 
times, or even that the language being spoken had changed (Broadbent, 1958). This 
occurs despite the unattended stream being just as loud, clear and easily 
comprehensible as the shadowed stream.
These experiments led to the formulation of Broadbent’s (1958) filter 
theory of attention, in which it is proposed that perception is a two stage process: in 
the first stage, the physical properties of all stimuli are extracted in parallel; in the 
second, limited capacity stage, higher level features such as the meaning of words 
are processed. In the case of multiple inputs, a filter (i.e., attention) protects the 
second stage from overload, allowing through only those stimuli having a 
particular physical property. Unattended information, therefore, is processed no 
further than its purely physical features.
The dichotic listening experiments were criticised, however, for employing 
retrospective measures of perception of the unattended stream (e.g., Deutsch & 
Deutsch, 1963), since participants may have perceived the semantic content of the
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unattended stream but simply forgotten it by the time the questions were posed a 
short while later. Treisman and Geffen (1967; and Treisman & Riley, 1969) 
attempted to provide a solution to this problem by instructing participants to 
shadow one channel and to stop shadowing and tap with a ruler when certain target 
words were heard in either of the two channels. Many target words in the 
unattended stream went unnoticed whereas those in the shadowed stream were 
nearly all detected, despite the use of an online measure of perception rather than a 
retrospective one precluding an explanation in terms of memory failure.
1.2.2 Selective Reading and Looking Experiments
Neisser (1969) developed an analogue of the dichotic listening paradigm in the 
visual domain, in which participants read aloud every other line of a text and 
ignored the lines in between. The findings were comparable to those of the dichotic 
listening experiments - very little of the content of the unattended lines of text 
could be reported later. This research was extended to non-verbal stimuli (Becklen 
& Cervone, 1983; Littman & Becklan, 1976; Neisser & Becklen, 1975) by showing 
two superimposed motion picture scenes and asking participants to attend 
exclusively to the action in one scene while ignoring the other. Participants 
consistently failed to report unexpected, yet highly conspicuous events in the 
unattended scene in so-called ‘selective looking’ experiments (an example of which 
is shown in Figure 1).
In a further line of evidence, Rock, Schauer, and Halper (1976) reported 
chance level recognition of unattended outline figures presented while participants 
performed an unrelated task. The experiment involved making aesthetic judgments 
of a stream of objects crossing the display, whilst ignoring a second, overlapping
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stream that moved in the opposite direction. Participants were unable to recognise 
items from the unattended stream in surprise recognition memory tests later on. 
Similar results were obtained with static images (Rock & Gutman, 1981): 
participants’ attention was directed at one of two superimposed line figures 
differentiated by colour, either by explicit instruction or by performance of a task 
involving only one figure. In a subsequent, unexpected recognition memory test, 
only the attended figures were recognised above chance level.
Figure 1. A frame from the selective looking study of Becklen and Cervone (1983). Participants 
monitored one team of ballplayers (black or white t-shirts), and a woman with an umbrella appeared 
unexpectedly during the clip (pictured here at the centre of the playing area).
These experiments, however, suffered from the same criticisms as the 
corresponding dichotic listening experiments: the retrospective measures employed 
prevented the exclusion of the possibility that participants had forgotten the
11
unattended information by the time it was queried, rather than not perceived it at 
the time it was presented.
1.2.3 Inattentional Blindness
There has been a recent resurgence of studies employing techniques similar to the 
selective looking paradigm. The earlier studies were criticised at the time because 
of the unnatural, degraded appearance of the action in the films that were used - a 
consequence of the superimposition of two semi-transparent sets of images. 
Recently, however, Simons and Chabris (1999) obtained similar results without 
superimposing two sets of images, by having both attended and unattended activity 
in the same film (see Figure 2).
Figure 2. A frame from the film used by Simons and Chabris (1999). Participants were instructed to 
count passes of the ball by either the team in white or black t-shirts. Unexpectedly, a man in a 
gorilla suit walks across the shot, pausing momentarily to 'beat his chest'.
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Interestingly, the complexity of the task participants performed correlated 
with awareness of the unattended event in this experiment, such that those 
performing a simpler task were significantly more likely to report it. This finding in 
particular strongly implicates the role of attention in determining conscious 
awareness of task-unrelated stimuli.
Computer-based experiments employing much simpler stimuli have yielded 
comparable findings. For example, Most and colleagues (Most, Scholl, Clifford, & 
Simons, 2005; Most, Simons, Scholl, & Chabris, 2000; Most et al., 2001) 
instructed participants to count the number of times that moving shapes of a certain 
colour ‘bounced’ off the sides of the screen, while ignoring moving shapes of 
another colour (see Figure 3).
Figure 3. A frame from a typical sustained inattentional blindness paradigm (Most and colleagues). 
Participants kept count of the number of times either the black or white shapes 'bounced' off the 
edges of the display, while an additional, unexpected shape (here a black cross) crossed the display.
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Reports of an unexpected but conspicuous cross-shape stimulus moving 
across the screen were infrequent, although its presence was almost always 
reported when there was no requirement to perform a task.
In a similar vein, Mack and Rock (1998) asked participants to judge 
whether the vertical or horizontal arm of a cross was longest, in a series of trials. 
On the final trial an additional stimulus was presented with the cross, and 
participants were subsequently asked if they had seen anything else in the display 
besides it (see Figure 4). A large proportion of participants failed to report having 
seen anything else in the display, despite being very likely to spot the additional 
stimulus when viewing the trial for a second time.
Figure 4. Examples of non-critical trial (left) and critical trial (right) displays in Mack and Rock’s 
(1998) inattentional blindness paradigm. Participants judged whether the vertical or horizontal line 
of the cross was longer. Afterwards, they were asked if they noticed the presence of an unexpected, 
task-irrelevant stimulus (here a triangle).
1.2.4 Indirect Measures of Perception
Indirect measures of perception involve assessing the processing of unattended 
information through its effect on related attended information or on involuntary and 
unconscious responses to the unattended information itself. For example, Mackay 
(1973) demonstrated that words in the unattended stream could bias the
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interpretation of ambiguous shadowed sentences, and Lewis (1970), and also 
Underwood (1977) reported a delay in shadowing when words with a related 
meaning were presented simultaneously in the unattended stream. As another 
example, Corteen and Dunn (1974) detected a galvanic skin response when words 
previously conditioned with an electric shock were presented in the unattended 
stream. Since these studies demonstrate semantic processing of unattended stimuli, 
they can be taken as falsifications of Broadbent’s (1958) filter theory and as 
evidence supporting the late selection view.
Further evidence for semantic processing of unattended information, and 
therefore late selection, comes from the classic Stroop (1935) experiments, in 
which participants were slower to report the colour of a word when the word itself 
was a contrasting colour, compared to when it was the same colour. The status of 
the Stroop effect as representing evidence of late selection, however, is thrown into 
doubt when it is considered that the unattended and attended information are 
different dimensions of the same stimulus. For that reason, it is unclear as to 
whether the unattended information can really be considered to be unattended. 
Indeed, when the two stimulus dimensions have been separated into two spatially 
distinct stimuli, i.e., a word and a patch of colour, studies have provided support for 
early selection (Kahneman & Henik, 1981), although others (Gatti & Egeth, 1978) 
have replicated the original Stroop task findings supporting late selection.
Many more studies in which the target and distractor stimuli are spatially 
separated have reinforced the late selection view of attention. Most notable of these 
is the response competition paradigm in which a task-irrelevant, but either 
response-congruent or -incongruent distractor is presented concurrently with a 
search display. Despite instruction to ignore such distractors, participants’ reaction
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times are slower in the presence of incongruent distractors than congruent 
distractors, showing that the identity of the distractor had been processed and its 
association with the target response acknowledged (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; 
Flowers & Wilcox, 1982; Gathercole & Broadbent, 1987; Miller, 1987; Murphy & 
Eriksen, 1987).
Another noteworthy indirect measure of distractor processing providing 
evidence for the late selection view of attention is negative priming, which is the 
slowing of target reaction time when the target has previously appeared as a 
distractor. It has been proposed that negative priming supports late selection since 
it shows that the distractor must have been perceived and the subsequent response 
inhibited (Tipper, 1985). Negative priming persists even when the distractor is a 
picture and the targets are words (Tipper & Driver, 1988), indicating that the 
distractors are processed to a semantic level.
Not all studies employing indirect measures of unattended stimuli have 
yielded findings supporting late selection, however. Several experiments have 
demonstrated conditions under which a lack of interference from unattended 
distractors is observed. For example, when distractors are physically distinct from 
targets (Francolini & Egeth, 1980), or are located at a distance from targets 
(Eriksen & Hoffman, 1973), or when larger search set sizes are used (Miller, 1991; 
Navon, 1989), distractor perception has been shown to be reduced or eliminated.
There is considerable evidence, therefore, for both the early and the late 
selection view of attention, sometimes from the same paradigm and even the same 
experiment, leading some to suggest that the early and late selection debate may 
never be resolved (e.g., Allport, 1993). It must be pointed out, however, that no
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study employing direct measures of perception that I am aware of has ever 
supported the late selection view.
1.3 Perceptual Load Theory: A Possible Resolution
A possible resolution to the early or late selection debate has been suggested in the 
form of a hybrid ‘perceptual load’ model (Lavie, 1995; Lavie & Tsai, 1994). 
According to this model, focused attention on a task prevents perception of task- 
irrelevant stimuli (early selection), when the task processing requirements involve a 
high level of perceptual load that consumes all available attentional capacity. By 
contrast, when the task processing requirements involve low perceptual load, any 
spare attentional capacity spills over involuntarily, resulting in automatic 
perception of irrelevant stimuli (late selection).
Lavie and Tsai (1994) conducted an extensive examination of previous 
studies of selective attention and found that experiments supporting early selection 
typically involve high levels of perceptual load, such as large search set sizes 
(Miller, 1991; Navon, 1989). Conversely, experiments supporting late selection 
typically involve low levels of perceptual load, such as a search set size of one 
(Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974).
Similar attempts to resolve the early or late selection debate with the 
suggestion of a hybrid model were made by Kahneman and Chajczyk (1983) and 
Yantis and Johnston (1990) prior to Lavie’s (1995; Lavie & Tsai, 1994) 
proposition. However, each of these models suffers from shortcomings that the 
perceptual load model overcomes: Kahneman and Chajczyk (1983) argue that the 
‘dilution’ effect they report, supporting early selection, represents the serial 
allocation of attentional resources to a subset of the task-unrelated stimuli that were
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presented concurrently with the task stimulus. Later research, however, has shown 
that a parallel processing model fits the data better than a serial one (Yee & Hunt, 
1991), and many investigators have concluded that a limited capacity model of 
attention may operate via a parallel process rather than serial (e.g., McLeod, 1977a; 
Townsend, 1971, 1974; Yantis & Johnson, 1990). Yantis and Johnston’s (1990) 
hybrid model, on the other hand, fails to delineate the conditions that distinguish 
between situations in which attention can be focused, resulting in early selection, 
and those in which it is incompletely or ineffectively focused, resulting in late 
selection. Furthermore, Yantis and Johnston (1990) did not demonstrate both early 
and late selection within the same set of experiments as Lavie (1995, 2000; Lavie 
& Cox, 1997) has done. I describe these experiments next.
1.3.1 Behavioural Research Supporting Perceptual Load Theory
Response competition experiments have tested the effect of perceptual load on the 
influence of task-irrelevant distractors (Lavie, 1995; Lavie, 2000; Lavie & Cox, 
1997). Typically, perceptual load is manipulated in a visual search task by varying 
the set size and a task-irrelevant but response-congruent, -neutral, or -incongruent 
flanker distractor is presented (example displays of high and low perceptual load 
are given in Figure 5). Under conditions of low perceptual load (e.g., set size one), 
search reaction times were slower in the presence of incongruent distractors than 
neutral or congruent distractors, suggesting that the identity of the distractor had 
been perceived. In the high perceptual load condition (e.g., set size six), such 
interference effects were eliminated: search reaction time was independent of 
distractor congruency. Further experiments made use of a go/no-go task in which
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task displays were identical, ruling out differences in the search displays as 
confounds of the effect of perceptual load.
Figure 5. Examples of displays used by Lavie and colleagues. Participants made a forced-choice 
response to letter targets (X or N), which appeared either among seven non-target letters (high load, 
top picture) or with none (low load, bottom picture). An irrelevant distractor (congruent, neutral or 
incongruent [as here]) was presented concurrently in the periphery.
The effect of perceptual load has recently been replicated using pictures of 
real-world objects as distractors. Lavie, Ro, and Russell (2003) presented pictures 
of congruent or incongruent objects as flanker distractors in an object name 
categorisation task (fruit or musical instrument, see Figure 6), and found that 
interference effects from the distractor pictures were reduced when the perceptual 
load of the task was increased by adding non-word letter-strings to the displays.
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Cslprmy Qhplrt
Bmpt Vrtjkslcg
Gtklsd Njplrtdn
« ;Sfhgjc Xnkprkm
Michael Jackson VLsjflym Gslpkn
hjlrbd
sdwqw
clptrvnh
banana
dkprtvbm
ghrbtwvp
Figure 6. Example displays from Lavie et al. (2003). Participants classified a target word (politician 
or musician in the top picture; fruit or musical instrument in the bottom picture). In the low load 
condition the target word appeared alone; in the high load condition the target word appeared 
among five nonsense words (as in both examples here). The words were flanked by an object that 
was either congruent or incongruent with the target word (both here are the latter).
Perceptual load has also been found to modulate explicit recognition 
memory for faces. Jenkins, Lavie, and Driver (2005) reported that the level of 
perceptual load in a letter-string task (colour discrimination task for low load; letter 
search task for high load) determined participants’ recognition memory 
performance for unfamiliar faces presented as irrelevant background distractors: 
under high perceptual load, recognition memory performance was poorer.
Beck and Lavie (2005), using the same manipulation of perceptual load as
Lavie and Cox (1997), compared the response compatibility effects of distractors
presented in the periphery with distractors presented directly at the point of
fixation, and found that although fixation distractors exerted greater compatibility
effects than peripheral distractors, increasing the perceptual load of a letter search
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task reduced the effects of distractors at fixation to the same extent as it reduced the 
effects of distractors in the periphery. Such a result suggests that the processing of 
information at fixation, despite being a higher priority, is subject to the same 
capacity limits as the processing of information elsewhere in the visual field.
Negative priming, the finding that responses to a target are slower when it 
has been previously presented as a distractor, has also been shown to be modulated 
by perceptual load (Lavie & Fox, 2000). When participants performed a search task 
of high perceptual load, the negative priming effect occurring under conditions of 
low perceptual load was eliminated. These results rule out active inhibition as an 
account of the effects of high perceptual load.
Such converging evidence showing the reduction of processing of task- 
irrelevant stimuli under high perceptual load supports the view that the availability 
of attentional capacity is the determinant of the perception of extraneous 
information.
1.3.2 Neuroimaging and Perceptual Load
In addition to the behavioural data, there is considerable support for the perceptual 
load model from neuroimaging research. Several studies have shown that 
perceptual load in a task modulates neural activity related to irrelevant distractors. 
For example, the perceptual load of a word task at fixation (monitor the word’s 
case for low load; monitor the number of syllables for high load) determined the 
level of neural activity in VI, V2, and V5/MT associated with the presence of 
irrelevant motion distractors (Rees, Frith, & Lavie, 1997); activity in V4 in 
response to an unattended coloured stimulus was also reduced in the high 
perceptual load condition of a picture task in the contralateral hemi-field (Pinsk,
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Doniger, & Kastner, 2003); no neural activity related to ignored word distractors 
was observed while participants monitored a high load rapid stream of 
superimposed pictures for repetitions (Rees, Russell, Frith, & Driver, 1999), and 
similarly, reduced neural activity related to ignored pictures of places was found 
while monitoring a rapid stream of faces with added noise to render the task high 
load (Yi, Woodman, Widders, Marois, & Chun, 2004). Schwartz et al. (2005) 
reported that activity related to a task-irrelevant peripheral chequerboard stimulus 
was reduced while participants were performing a high perceptual load RS VP 
monitoring task compared to when the task was of low perceptual load with 
identical stimuli. This relative decrease was present in VI and became larger for 
successive visual areas through to V4. Such attenuation of neural activity under 
high load conditions has even been found in the amygdala in response to emotional 
facial expressions, an area thought to be independent of attentional influence 
(Pessoa, McKenna, Gutierrez, & Ungerleider, 2002), and also in the lateral 
geniculate nucleus (O’Connor, Fukui, Pinsk, & Kastner, 2002), which is the 
earliest stage possible at which visual processing can be affected by higher order 
cognitive processes.
1.3.3 Perceptual Load and Conscious Awareness
Such converging evidence from behavioural and neuroimaging research strongly 
suggests that, as with indirect measures such as effects on reaction times, error 
rates and neural activity, subjective conscious awareness of extraneous information 
will be modulated by the level of perceptual load demanded by the task at hand. 
Whereas high perceptual load that engages full attention in the task should prevent 
awareness of irrelevant stimuli, low perceptual load will not exhaust capacity,
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resulting in a ‘spilling-over’ of awareness to include such stimuli. However, despite 
the focus of the theory on the extent to which task-irrelevant stimuli are perceived, 
in nearly all previous studies the conclusions about irrelevant stimulus processing 
are based upon indirect measures of perception, such as effects on target reaction 
times (RTs) or neural activity. Thus, although these studies demonstrate that the 
processing of task-irrelevant stimuli is determined by the level of perceptual load of 
task processing, in general support of load theory, they do not provide any evidence 
in support of the claim that perceptual load should determine conscious awareness. 
Specifically, the effects of perceptual load on neural activity related to task- 
irrelevant stimuli can not support any direct conclusions about conscious 
perceptual experience. Indeed Bahrami, Lavie, and Rees (2007) have recently 
shown that perceptual load can modulate VI activity related to an invisible 
irrelevant stimulus that the participants did not consciously perceive. The effects of 
distractors on target reaction times in the behavioural experiments also can not 
support any direct conclusions about conscious perception since one can not 
deduce whether a participant was conscious of the distractors or not on the basis of 
their RT to the target. Indeed, the RT results can be construed either way. If the 
participants had never been conscious of the distractors in either of the load 
conditions then their effects on target RTs under conditions of low load can be 
explained by unconscious processing of stimulus-response associations.
Conversely, if the participants had always been conscious of the distractors in both 
of the load conditions then the elimination of the distractor effects on target RTs 
under high load could be the result of post-perceptual response selection processes, 
although the argument that distractor RT effects may have simply dissipated during 
the longer RTs in high load tasks is ruled out by the fact that manipulations that
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increase task difficulty, and consequently RTs, without increasing perceptual load, 
e.g., working memory load (Lavie, 2000; Lavie et al., 2004) or stimulus 
degradation (Lavie & De Fockert, 2003), increase distractor effects rather than 
decrease them. While this body of research, therefore, provides convincing 
evidence that perceptual load determines neural activity related to task-irrelevant 
stimuli and the extent to which distractors interfere with task performance, it does 
not provide an answer to the question of whether the conscious awareness of task- 
irrelevant stimuli is affected by perceptual load.
1.3.4 Inattentional Blindness and Perceptual Load
Only one experiment so far has tested the effect of perceptual load on subjective 
conscious awareness. Cartwright-Finch and Lavie (2007) recently investigated the 
effects of perceptual load on awareness reports with the inattentional blindness 
paradigm. In a series of experiments, they found that the number of participants 
who reported being aware of a task-irrelevant stimulus presented unexpectedly was 
strongly dependent on the level of perceptual load of the task performed. Tasks of 
high perceptual load (the discrimination of cross arms of very similar length or 
visual search for a letter among similar non-target letters) yielded a considerably 
lower rate of awareness reports (typically around 40-50%), compared with tasks of 
low perceptual load (the discrimination of cross arms of very different length or 
colour, or visual search for a letter among very dissimilar non-target letters). This 
study conclusively demonstrates that high perceptual load is far more likely to 
produce inattentional blindness than low perceptual load. However, this study 
suffers from the limitations of the inattentional blindness paradigm that I describe 
next.
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1.4 Criticisms of Inattentional Blindness
Two major criticisms have been levelled at the inattentional blindness paradigm. 
One concerns expectation and the other memory.
1.4.1 Expectation
With the inattentional blindness paradigm, the critical stimulus is not only 
unattended, but also unexpected. Inattention is therefore confounded with 
expectation and so the reduction in awareness may be caused by a lack of 
expectation rather than a lack of attention. Neisser and colleagues argued this point 
in their early work on selective looking (e.g., Neisser, 1979; Neisser & Becklen, 
1975). A failure to expect or anticipate a stimulus might lead to ‘blindness’, since 
stimuli near threshold typically require a degree of familiarity to be consciously 
perceived (Braun, 2001). The same could theoretically be true for the supra- 
threshold stimuli used in the inattentional blindness paradigm.
Some studies avoid being confounded by expectation by comparing 
inattentional blindness under different conditions; for example, Cartwright-Finch 
and Lavie (2007) show that inattentional blindness is more likely under high 
perceptual load than low, instead of simply contrasting rates of inattentional 
blindness in the unattended trial with rates in a control trial in which the previously 
unattended extra stimulus is now anticipated (e.g., Mack & Rock, 1998). However, 
the conclusions of such studies are nevertheless limited to the case of surprise 
events.
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1.4.2 Memory
Wolfe (1999) proposed the ‘inattentional amnesia’ hypothesis to explain the 
phenomenon of inattentional blindness. In the majority of inattentional blindness 
studies, participants are questioned a relatively long time after the offset of the 
stimulus and after the dissipation of the iconic representation. Rather than having 
not seen the irrelevant stimulus, therefore, participants may have simply forgotten 
it had been there.
A different account of inattentional blindness involving memory is that 
rather than the failure of awareness being the consequence of having forgotten 
something that was consciously seen, the failure is attributed to the object having 
never been encoded into memory in the first place (Moore, 2001; Moore & Egeth, 
1997). Also, as both the presence of the extra stimulus and its physical appearance 
(e.g., colour, shape and location) are unexpected, it is possible that the extra 
stimulus is perceived, but only generates a weak signal (Barber & Folkard, 1972; 
Bashinski & Bacharach 1980; Davies, Kramer, & Graham, 1983; Teichner & 
Krebs, 1974) that is easily wiped out of memory with the delay incurred by the task 
response and the processing of the surprise question. The effects of perceptual load 
on awareness reports in the inattentional blindness paradigm may then, at least in 
part, reflect reduced encoding of the unexpected stimulus into memory instead of, 
or in addition to, reduced perception.
These two major confounds, expectation and memory failure, have 
persistently been proposed as alternative explanations of the findings of older 
selective looking and dichotic listening experiments, and more recent inattentional 
blindness studies alike, and have never been convincingly ruled out.
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1.5 General Methodological Approach and Overview
The experiments in the following chapters examine the effects of perceptual 
load on conscious perception with a modified inattentional blindness paradigm in 
which the presence of a critical stimulus (CS) was expected in some of the trials. 
Furthermore, examples of the exact stimulus to be presented were shown, so that its 
visual appearance was known in advance, and participants completed a block of 
practice trials before starting the experiment. Thus, perception of this critical 
stimulus could be measured online, with responses occurring straight after the task 
response, or even immediately upon presentation (i.e., before the perceptual load 
task response, see Experiment 4). Since the irrelevant stimulus was fully 
anticipated and participants could respond to it immediately, this method rules out 
both the expectation and memory accounts of the inattentional blindness paradigm. 
Results showing a lower rate of detection of the critical stimulus with high 
perceptual load will therefore provide stronger evidence for the notion that 
attention is a prerequisite of conscious awareness. Furthermore, with the 
inattentional blindness paradigm there was no way to assess detection sensitivity as 
the CS was always presented just once. Since here the CS is presented multiple 
times, the effects of perceptual load on detection sensitivity (as distinct from 
response criterion) could be assessed. It follows directly from perceptual load 
theory that detection sensitivity for task-irrelevant stimuli will be reduced under 
conditions of high perceptual load, although this prediction has not, as yet, been 
tested.
It is important to note that although this prediction is directly derived from 
perceptual load theory, it contradicts the traditional view that early perceptual
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processes such as detection are capacity-free, and hence do not depend on the 
allocation of attention (Braun & Sagi, 1990; 1991; Posner & Boies, 1971; Shaw, 
1984). This notion has typically been tested in experiments comparing detection 
and discrimination performance under single versus dual-task conditions. The 
comparison of single and dual-task conditions, however, is confounded by non- 
attentional processes such as making an additional response (only in the dual-task 
condition) and memory (due to the delay caused by making the first task response 
in the dual-task condition alone). In contrast, the test I have designed to determine 
whether detection sensitivity is governed specifically by the level of perceptual 
load (rather than general task difficulty, see Chapter 6) makes use of a task that 
remains the same in all respects (including the number of responses and the length 
of time that task decisions must be held in memory), apart from the perceptual load 
of the search task. This research, therefore, not only elucidates the role of 
perceptual load in conscious awareness, but also resolves the important issue of 
whether early perceptual processing, involving mere presence or absence detection, 
is subject to capacity limits.
Chapter 2 presents a demonstration of load induced blindness using the 
methodology I have introduced while ruling out accounts of the results in terms of 
the RT differences between the conditions of perceptual load. The experiments in 
Chapter 3 preclude accounts of the results in terms of goal-neglect, the priority of 
detection, memory failure and high CS location uncertainty. This was achieved by 
employing four different manipulations that each raise the priority of the detection 
task: making the detection response first, increasing the probability of CS 
presentation, introducing the requirement that a response is made even when the 
CS is absent so that a detection response is made on every trial, and reducing the
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number of locations in which the CS can appear. Chapter 4 addresses concerns 
regarding whether participants employ separate strategies in the different 
conditions of perceptual load by measuring load induced blindness when low and 
high perceptual load trials are intermixed within blocks. In Chapter 5 ,1 investigate 
whether the retinal location at which the CS is presented affects detection, 
specifically comparing the fovea with peripheral locations. In addition, I examine 
whether perceptual load reduces detection sensitivity when the CS is presented at 
the fovea. The final issue I consider, in Chapter 6, is the effect of working memory 
load on detection. Recent studies of perceptual load theory have looked at how 
loading working memory can affect perception. Such studies have shown that 
working memory load has the opposite effect to perceptual load, but so far the 
assessment of the perception of task-unrelated stimuli has been limited to indirect 
measures such as RTs and neuroimaging. It is therefore important to test the effect 
of working memory load on conscious awareness.
29
Chapter 2
The Role of Perceptual Load
30
The experiments in Chapter 2 sought to establish the effect of perceptual load on 
the detection of a task-unrelated stimulus. Perceptual load theory proposes that 
perception of such a stimulus depends upon whether attentional capacity is 
exhausted by the perceptual demands of a concurrent task: the stimulus is perceived 
if task demands on attention are minimal; it will not be perceived, however, if 
attending to the task fully loads capacity. Hence, detection of the CS should suffer 
while participants are simultaneously performing a task of high perceptual load. By 
contrast, when the task is of low perceptual load, detection of the CS should be 
reliable since there is sufficient capacity available to perceive both the task stimuli 
and the CS.
2.1 Experiment 1
Participants were presented with a circle of letters on each trial and asked to search 
for either of the target letters X or N. They were also asked to detect a small, 
meaningless grey figure, referred to hereafter as the critical stimulus (or CS), that 
was presented outside of the letter circle. Example trials with the CS presented 
were shown at the start of the experiment. Perceptual load was manipulated by 
varying the target--non-target similarity in the circle of letters (e.g., Lavie & Cox, 
1997). In the high perceptual load condition the non-target letters were H, K, M, W 
and Z, making this condition a set size 6 search task. In the low perceptual load 
condition the non-targets were all O’s and were considerably smaller than the target 
letter: they can therefore be considered as place-holders rather than non-targets, 
rendering the low perceptual load condition effectively a set size 1 search task..
The experimental blocks were followed by a control block of trials in which the 
participants were asked to not perform the letter search task and just detect the
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presence of the CS. The search displays were the same as those in the experimental 
blocks. Any participant with a CS detection rate of lower than 75% in the control 
block was excluded.
2.1.1 Method
P artic ipan ts. Sixteen participants were recruited at University College 
London (UCL) and were paid for their participation (the rate of pay was £6 per 
hour for all the experiments reported). One participant was excluded and replaced 
because her accuracy on the letter search task was under 65%, three because they 
detected less than 75% of the critical stimuli in the control block, and two because 
their false alarm rate in the control block was over 40%. The age range of those 
included was 19 to 35 years (M =  22.5 years, S D  = 3.8 years) and there were four 
men. All of the participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were 
nai've to the purposes of the experiment.
A p p a ra tu s a n d  Stim uli. The experiments were created and run with E-Prime 
(Psychology Software Tools, Inc., 2003) on a Dell PC attached to a Sony 15” 
monitor. A viewing distance of 57 cm was maintained throughout the experiment 
with a chin rest. Six letters were presented equally spaced (nearest contours 0.95° 
apart), in a circle of 1.7° radius that was centred at fixation. The background of the 
display was mid-grey (RGB values: 204, 204, 204), the CS was a darker grey 
(RGB values: 153, 153, 153) and the letters were black. For a mask, a black mesh 
pattern covered the whole screen except for a square (9.5° by 9.5°) in the centre so 
as not to mask the circle of letters. The target letter, a capital letter X or N (0.6° by 
0.6°), each equally likely, appeared at random but with equal probability at one of 
the six letter locations. The remaining five locations were occupied in the low
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perceptual load condition by smaller letter O’s (0.2° by 0.2°) and in the high 
perceptual load condition by the letters H, K, M, W and Z (of the same size as the 
target letter). The CS, a grey meaningless shape (0.3° by 0.3°), was presented at 
one of six equally spaced locations arranged in a circle of radius 5.4°. Each CS 
location lay on an imaginary line that passed through the fixation point and 
bisected two adjacent letter locations.
The combinations of target letter location and CS location were 
counterbalanced, so that for each target letter location the CS was presented once in 
each of four locations, the two nearest locations to the target letter (one on either 
side) and the two farthest locations. The stimuli were presented in two blocks of 72 
trials with the CS presented in 12 randomly selected trials per block (17%). It 
appeared twice in each of the six locations forming the imaginary circle, consisting 
of, for each target location, once in one of the two near-target letter locations (and 
in the other near location in the other block) and once in one of the two far 
locations (and in the other far location in the other block). A counterbalanced set of 
144 different stimulus displays consisted of each of the target letters (two: X or N) 
in each of the letter circle locations (six), either without or with the CS in each 
location (six), and its location relative to the target (two: near or far). In the high 
perceptual load condition there were also 144 randomly selected non-target 
arrangements. The control block used half of the displays from the first 
experimental block and half from the second, such that the CS still appeared twice 
at each of the six locations.
P rocedu re . A schematic of the procedure of Experiment 1 is shown in 
Figure 7. A fixation dot was presented at the centre of the screen for 1 s at the start 
of each trial, followed by the search task display for 100 ms (which included the
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CS in 17% of the trials). A mask was then presented for 500 ms and subsequently a 
blank screen that lasted for 2.1 s, during which participants made the search task 
response followed by the CS detection response. This 2.7 s interval elapsed 
whether any responses were made or not. The participants were instructed to make 
the search task response as quickly and as accurately as possible, and if they 
detected the CS, to make the detection response immediately following the search 
task response. Participants pressed the ‘O’ key with their thumb for the target ‘X’, 
and the ‘2’ key with their forefinger for the target ‘N ’, using the numeric key pad 
with their right hands. Detection of the CS was indicated by pressing the ‘S’ key 
with the forefinger of the left hand. If no response or an incorrect response to the 
search task was made, a ‘beep’ was heard at the end of each trial. There was no 
feedback for detection.
X  2100 ms
Figure 7. A schematic of the procedure of Experiment 1.
Before starting the experiment, the participants were shown nine example 
trials with no CS followed by six example trials with the CS. During each of these
the participant confirmed verbally whether she had seen the CS or not, and they 
were repeated for participants who failed to see the CS at least three times. Each 
participant then completed two experimental blocks of 72 trials, both of the same 
level of perceptual load (low for half of the participants, high for the other half), 
followed by a control block of 72 trials (including 12 CS trials), in which 
participants were instructed to respond to the presence of the CS but to ignore the 
circle of letters.
2.1.2 Results and Discussion
L etter  Search. Trials in which the search response was incorrect (see mean 
error rates) and those in which reaction time (RT) was greater than 1.5 s (M = 2.2% 
of correct trials per participant in Experiment 1) were excluded from the RT 
analyses in all of the experiments reported in this thesis. One way analyses of 
variance (ANOVA) on mean search RT and search error rate in the low and high 
perceptual load conditions revealed that mean search RT was significantly longer 
in the high perceptual load condition (M =  818 ms) than in the low perceptual load 
condition ( M =  564 ms), F ( \ ,  14) = 23.99, M S E  =  10,718.63, p  <  .001, r|p2 = .63 
(two tailed, as is every statistical test in this thesis), and search error rate in the high 
perceptual load group ( M =  12.9%) was significantly higher than in the low 
perceptual load group ( M =  3.7%), F ( \ ,  14) = 26.74, M SE  = 12.46, p  <  .001, iiP2 = 
.66. These results confirm that the perceptual load manipulation was effective.
C S  D etection . Percentage detection rate and false alarm rate, d ’ (a measure 
of detection sensitivity that incorporates both detection rate and false alarm rate), 
and |3 (a measure of response criterion that represents the relative proportions of 
present and absent responses) were calculated for each participant, excluding any
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trials in which the search response was incorrect. The means of these are shown as 
a function of perceptual load in Table 1.
Table 1. Mean (and Standard Deviation) Percentage Detection and False Alarm Rates and Mean 
(and Standard Deviation) d ’ and P as a Function of Perceptual Load in Experiment 1.
Perceptual load Detection rate %
False alarm 
rate % d ’ P
Low 97.2 (3.4) 0.6 (1.0) 4.27 (0.34) 4.99 (3.76)
High 55.8 (36.4) 1.9 (4.7) 2.44 (1.31) 11.01 (8.34)
One way ANOVA indicated that detection rate was significantly lower in 
the high perceptual load condition than in the low perceptual load condition, F ( 1, 
14) = 10.38, M SE  =  667.67, p  =  .006, r\p2 = .43, and that d ’ in the high perceptual 
load condition was also significantly lower than that in the low perceptual load 
condition, F ( 1,14) = 14.60, M SE  = 0.92, p  = .002, rjp2 = .51. |3 was not significantly 
different between the low and high load conditions, F ( 1, 14) = 3.45, M SE  =  41.87, 
p  =  .084, rjp = .20, despite a trend for a more stringent criterion in the high load.
Since the search task error rate was higher in the high perceptual load 
condition than in the low load condition, there were more critical trials excluded 
from the analysis in the high load condition (M =  3.6 out of 24 excluded [15.0%]) 
than in the low load condition (.M =  1 out of 24 excluded [4.2%]). However, even 
when the incorrect search task trials were included in the analysis, detection rate 
and d ’ were still significantly lower in the high perceptual load condition (M 
detection rate = 54.2%, M d ’ =  2.45) than the low load condition ( M detection rate 
= 96.4%, M d ’ = 4.21), F (l, 14) = 11.03, M SE  =  6 5 1 3 5 ,  p  =  .005, t \ 2  = .44 and 
F ( 1, 14) = 13.71, M SE  =  0.91,p  =  .002, r|p2 = .50 for detection rate and d \
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respectively. Furthermore, (3 remained unaffected by perceptual load, F (l, 14) = 
3.83, M SE  =  50.43, p  = .071, V  = .22.'
The distance between the search task target letter and the CS (coded as 
either ‘near’ or ‘far’) had a small but non-significant effect on detection rate (near 
M  = 78.7%; far M =  1 4 .4 % ), F ( 1, 14) = 1.90, M SE  = 78.34,p  =  .190, V  = .12, and 
there was no interaction of distance and perceptual load, F  <  1, in a two way 
ANOVA on detection rate with load and distance as factors (this analysis could not 
be performed for d ’ or p since it was not possible to assign false alarm responses to 
distance conditions).
CS detection performance in the control block, during which participants 
did not perform the letter search task, was equivalent in the low (M detection rate = 
96.9%, M false alarm rate = 0.4%, M d ’ =  3.92, M p = 4.82) and high (Mdetection 
rate = 99.0%, M false alarm rate = 3.3%, M d ’ = 3.61, M p = 2.10) perceptual load 
conditions, F  <  1 for detection rate, F ( 1,14) = 2.68, M SE  = 0.14, p  = .124, r\p2 =
.16 for d \  and F ( l ,  14) = 6.04, M SE  =  5.10, p  =  .028, t|p2 = .30 for p.3 This 
significant difference in (3 indicates that participants in the high load condition had 
a more liberal criterion in the control block than those in the low load condition,
1 This extra analysis was performed for all the experiments in this thesis, and in every case the 
outcome was the same: whether the incorrect search task trials were included or not made no 
difference to the effect of perceptual load, whether on detection rate, d \  or p.
2 The results of this analysis were the same for all the experiments in this thesis, therefore distance 
effects are not reported for any further experiments.
3 These analyses on detection rate, d \  and p in the control block were repeated for each experiment 
in this thesis, and they did not reveal any significant differences other than here and in Experiment 
6. They are therefore not reported for any further experiments except for Experiment 6.
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which can be observed in their higher mean detection and false alarm rates. This 
may have been due to their experience of detecting the CS during the experimental 
blocks having been that much more difficult than for those in the low perceptual 
load condition. Nevertheless, clearly the lower detection rate and detection 
sensitivity in the high perceptual load experimental blocks was related to the actual 
performance of the search task, rather than just the appearance of the display, since 
detection rate and detection sensitivity were comparable in the low and high 
perceptual load conditions when participants did not have to perform the search 
task while attempting to detect the CS.
These findings represent preliminary evidence for the hypothesis that the 
level of perceptual load in a task dictates whether task-unrelated stimuli are 
detected or not. Whereas nearly all of the CS ( M =  9 1 .2 % ) were detected during a 
task of low perceptual load, this rate was reduced dramatically to approximately 
half ( M -  55.8%), on average, for participants performing a task of high perceptual 
load. The results demonstrate that the availability of attention, here manipulated by 
the level of perceptual load in a letter search task, is critical for conscious 
perception of additional, task-unrelated stimuli.
2.2 Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, the mean search RT for the high perceptual load search task was 
about 250 ms longer than that for the low load search task. Since in Experiment 1 
there was a single interval of 2.7 s in which to make the search task response 
followed by the CS detection response, the longer search RT in the high load 
condition left less time remaining to make the CS detection response compared to 
the low load condition. It is therefore possible that at least some of the misses in the
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high load condition were in fact very slow CS detection responses that were made 
after the 2.7 s interval had elapsed. In addition, the slower search task responses in 
the high load condition led to a longer delay between CS presentation and CS 
response in the high load than low load, and therefore the results could be 
explained in terms of a greater likelihood of memory failure in the high load 
condition.
In order to examine the effects of perceptual load on detection with an equal 
interval for detection responses in the low and high perceptual load conditions, and 
an equal delay between CS presentation and CS detection response, in Experiment 
2 the presentation of the stimuli was followed by a fixed 2 s interval for the search 
response, and then another fixed 2 s interval for the CS detection response. Each 
interval elapsed regardless of whether a response was made or not.
Participants were told that they should make the search response as soon as 
possible following the display of stimuli, and then make the CS detection response 
upon the appearance of a question mark at the start of the second 2 s interval. With 
this procedure, the length of time available for making the CS detection response 
was longer than before and, most importantly, was identical in the two conditions 
of perceptual load. The interval between CS presentation and response was also 
now equal. A replication of the perceptual load effect on CS detection in 
Experiment 2 would therefore allow alternative explanations in terms of very slow 
detection responses or memory failure to be ruled out.
2.2.1 Method
P a rtic ip a n ts. Sixteen new participants were recruited from UCL and were 
paid for their participation. One was replaced because he detected less than 75% of
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the CS in the control block. The age range of those included was 18 to 34 years (M  
= 24.9 years, SD = 4.4 years) and there was one man.
Stimuli and Procedure. A schematic of the procedure of Experiment 2 is 
shown in Figure 8. The apparatus, stimuli, and procedure were the same as 
Experiment 1, except that the participants were instructed to withhold the detection 
response until the appearance of a question mark that was presented 2 s after the 
onset of the stimuli. This question mark was presented at the centre of the screen 
for 100 ms and was followed by a blank screen for a further 1.9 s. Both 2 s 
intervals elapsed regardless of whether a response was made or not.
1000 ms
100 ms
500 ms
x
1400 ms
100 ms
?
1900 ms
Figure 8. A schematic of the procedure of Experiment 2.
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2.2.2 Results and Discussion
L etter  Search. As with Experiment 1, mean search RT was significantly 
longer in the high perceptual load condition ( M =  766 ms) than the low perceptual 
load condition (M =  593 ms), F ( 1, 14) = 8.68, M SE  =  13,742.09, p  =  .011, r\p2 =
.38, and search error rate in the high perceptual load condition ( M -  10.6%) was 
significantly higher than in the low perceptual load condition ( M =  3.0%), F (l, 14) 
= 58.27, M SE  =  3.99, p  < .001, rjp2 = .81. Hence perceptual load was successfully 
increased with the manipulation of search set size in Experiment 2.
C S  D etection . Mean percentage detection and false alarm rates, and mean d ’ 
and p for correct search trials only as a function of perceptual load are presented in 
Table 2.
Table 2. Mean (and SD) Percentage Detection and False Alarm Rates and Mean (and SD) d ’ and P 
as a Function of Perceptual Load in Experiment 2.
Perceptual load Detection rate %
False alarm 
rate % d ’ P
Low 90 .0  (21.5) 2.5 (2.8) 3.70 (0.81) 5.52 (9.86)
High 36.8 (32.6) 7.9 (13.9) 1.30 (1.53) 8.95 (10.78)
As the figures in the table suggest, detection rate and d ’ were significantly
lower under high perceptual load than low, F (l, 14) = 15.06, M SE  = 756.46, p  =
.002, rjp2 = .52 and F ( 1, 14) = 15.44, M SE  =  1.50, p  =  .002, r|p2 = .52, respectively,
as with Experiment 1. Furthermore, P was not significantly different between the
low and high load conditions, F  <  1.
Experiment 2 therefore replicated the effect of perceptual load on CS
detection found in Experiment 1, even though there was now more time available
in both the low and high perceptual load conditions to make the detection response,
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and, most importantly, this longer interval was of equal duration in the two 
conditions and was independent of search RT. The effect of perceptual load on 
detection can therefore not be attributed to a larger number of very slow detection 
responses occurring after the interval had elapsed in the high load condition. 
Furthermore, the delay between CS presentation and when the CS response could 
be made was now fixed, and was therefore equal in the low and high perceptual 
load conditions, precluding an explanation of the results in terms of a greater 
likelihood of memory failure due to a longer delay in the high load condition.
2.3 Experiment 3
In Experiments 1 and 2, the manipulation of perceptual load was validated by the 
fact that mean search RT in the high load condition was longer than that in the low 
load condition. However, since in Experiment 2 the interval for the search response 
always elapsed, there would have been less time remaining following the search 
response before the detection response was made in the high load condition. It is 
therefore possible that decision and response preparation processes related to CS 
detection were at a disadvantage in the high perceptual load condition, and this may 
have produced the reduction in detection rate and sensitivity. To rule out this 
possibility, it was necessary to assess the effect of perceptual load on CS detection 
in a design in which the RT for the letter search task was equal in the low and high 
perceptual load conditions, so that the interval between the search response and the 
detection response would also be equal. In Experiment 3, therefore, the participants 
were forced to wait until 2 s after the presentation of the stimuli before responding 
to the search task. I anticipated that this delay would equate search RT in the low 
and high load conditions. Unless the effect of perceptual load was due to the
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shorter time available in the high load to prepare for the detection response, the 
results of Experiment 3 should replicate those of Experiments 1 and 2.
2.3.1 Method
Participants. Sixteen new participants were recruited from UCL and were 
paid for their participation. One participant was replaced because her accuracy on 
the letter search task was lower than 65%, three because they detected less than 
75% of the critical stimuli in the control block, and one because his mean search 
RT was over two standard deviations above the group mean. The age range of 
those included was 19 to 28 years (M= 23.5 years, SD = 3.3 years) and there were 
four men.
Stimuli and Procedure. A schematic of the procedure of Experiment 3 is 
shown in Figure 9. The apparatus, stimuli, and procedure were the same as 
Experiment 2 except that the participants were instructed to make their response to 
the search task 2 s after stimulus onset, at which point ‘X/N?’ was presented at the 
centre of the screen for 100 ms. This was followed by a 1.9 s blank screen, during 
which time the participants made the search response. Immediately following the 
search response, a question mark was presented at the centre of the screen for 100 
ms, indicating that the detection response should now be made. Participants were 
allowed 2 s to make the CS detection response, and the next trial began either after 
their response or after the 2 s had elapsed.
1000 ms
x
X1000 ms
100 ms
500 ms
X / N ?1400 ms
100 ms
1900 ms
100 ms
1900 ms
Figure 9. A schematic of the procedure of Experiment 3.
2.3.2 Results and Discussion
Letter Search. As predicted, with the 2 s delay of the search response there 
was no longer a difference in mean search RT between the high (M=  337 ms) and 
the low (M=  335 ms) perceptual load conditions, F < 1. The error rate in the high 
perceptual load condition (M= 20.7%) was, nevertheless, significantly higher than 
in the low perceptual load condition (M= 3.1%), F (l, 14) = 31.38, MSE = 39.60,/? 
< .001, r|p = .69, demonstrating that, despite the comparable RT, perceptual load 
was again successfully increased with the manipulation of search set size.
CS Detection. Mean percentage detection and false alarm rates, and mean d ’ 
and P for correct search trials only as a function of perceptual load are presented in 
Table 3.
Table 3. Mean (and SD) Percentage Detection and False Alarm Rates and Mean (and SD) d ’ and P 
as a Function of Perceptual Load in Experiment 3.
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Perceptual load Detection rate %
False alarm 
rate % d ’ P
Low 86.0 (19.8) 1.8 (1.7) 3.53 (0.86) 6.90 (10.46)
High 47.9 (37.1) 4.5 (5.7) 1.84 (1.57) 7.34 (10.14)
Detection rate and d ’ were again significantly lower in the high load 
condition, F (l, 14) = 6.53, M SE  =  883.98,/) = .023, riP2 = .32 and F ( \ ,  14) = 7.16, 
M S E =  1.61,/)= .018, rip2 = .34 for detection rate and d  \  respectively, and p was 
not significantly different between the low and high load conditions, F  <  1. These 
results rule out an alternative account of the poorer CS detection in the high load in 
terms of there being less time available for decision and response preparation 
processes for CS detection in that condition than in the low load condition.
2.4 Chapter Conclusions
The experiments in this chapter have demonstrated the effect of perceptual load on 
conscious awareness. Detection rate and sensitivity of an additional, task-irrelevant 
stimulus were reduced considerably when the perceptual load of the search task 
was increased from low to high, in all three experiments. Experiment 1 had an 
advantage over Experiments 2 and 3 in terms of the design being less susceptible to 
the claim that the CS was forgotten rather than not perceived, since the detection 
response was made immediately after the search response with no further delay (the 
detection response occurred in the region of 500 to 800 ms after CS presentation, 
rather than two seconds after CS presentation as in Experiments 2 and 3). However, 
this also meant that there was more time remaining to make the CS detection 
response in the low perceptual load condition than in the high load condition in 
Experiment 1, which could theoretically have resulted in fewer very slow CS
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detection responses being recorded in the high than low load, potentially 
confounding the results. Experiment 2 ruled out this potential confound since there 
was always 2 s available for detection responses in both load conditions. In 
Experiment 3, mean search RT was equal in the low and high perceptual load 
conditions. This was achieved by introducing a 2 s delay between the presentation 
of the stimuli and the search response. With this design, an alternative account of 
the results of Experiment 2, that detection sensitivity was reduced under high 
perceptual load due to less time being available for decision and response 
preparation processes after the longer high load search RT, was eliminated.
The findings presented in this chapter therefore support the hypothesis that 
perceptual load determines conscious awareness of task-irrelevant stimuli, and 
serve to further the resolution of the early and late selection debate by the 
perceptual load model.
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Chapter 3
Detection Priority
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The aim of this chapter was to address issues regarding the priority of CS detection, 
as well as alternative accounts of the results in terms of memory failure. In this 
chapter introduction I first consider task priority and goal-neglect, before 
discussing memory-based accounts of inattentional blindness.
A concern with using a dual-task paradigm such as that used here, is that 
participants may not give the two tasks equal priority -  one task may be prioritised 
over the other. When performing both tasks together is relatively easy this is 
unlikely to be a problem; however, when performing both is more difficult, 
participants may have to prioritise one task at the expense of the other (Desimone 
& Duncan, 1995). In the case of the experiments reported here this is of particular 
concern, since performing both tasks is easier in the low load condition than in the 
high load condition, meaning that participants may prioritise the search task over 
the detection task to a greater extent in the high load than low load condition. If this 
were the case, it could result in poorer performance in the detection task in the high 
load, since the reduced priority of CS detection could, at least in some cases, lead 
participants to neglect the task requirements (i.e., monitor for the presence of the 
CS and make a response when it is detected), a phenomenon termed ‘goal neglect’ 
(Duncan, 1990, 1993, 1995; for related work, see De Jong, 2000, 2001; De Jong, 
Berendsen, & Cools, 1999; Kane & Engle, 2003; Roberts & Pennington, 1996; 
West, 2001).
Duncan proposed that organised behaviour can only occur in the absence of 
strong external cues for action if it can be guided by a hierarchy of goal 
abstractions. This guidance occurs via an attentional goal weighting process that 
relies on intact prefrontal cortex (PFC) function, and represents the essence of 
general fluid intelligence (Duncan, Emslie, Williams, Johnson, & Freer, 1996).
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Support for this hypothesis has come from demonstrations that low-intelligence 
individuals, patients with PFC damage, and participants in dual-task conditions 
often fail to respond according to task goals when the environment lacks 
appropriate action prompts (e.g., Duncan, Burgess, & Emslie, 1995; Duncan et al., 
1996). Strikingly, the failure to carry out planned goals is typically accompanied by 
an intact ability to articulate the goal when queried. This indicates that the goal was 
temporarily absent from working memory, i.e., it was ‘neglected’, and yet was 
retrievable from long-term memory.
Duncan et al. (1996) demonstrated goal-neglect using a paradigm in which 
participants were asked to read aloud the letters from one of two simultaneously 
presented RSVP streams of letters and numbers. Towards the end of each trial, a 
‘+’ or a symbol was presented, interrupting the stream, the former indicating 
that attention should now be directed at the right-sided stream; the latter, the left­
sided stream. In either case, a switch of attention from one side to the other may 
have been required, depending on which side was started with. Goal-neglect 
occurred when participants failed to switch streams when it was required. This 
phenomenon occurred with low Culture-Fair IQ participants, frontal lobe damaged 
patients (but not patients with damage in other areas) and elderly participants. It 
was demonstrated in higher IQ participants by combining the stream monitoring 
task with a dot location task (locating a dot presented either above or below the 
RSVP streams during some of the trials). In this dual-task condition, many 
participants neglected to switch between streams or to locate the dot.
Given the fact that the high perceptual load letter search task (set size six) 
was considerably more demanding than the low load letter search task (set size 
one), goal-neglect is certainly a potential confound of the perceptual load effect on
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CS detection. When the search task was of high load, participants may have 
deprioritised CS detection by focusing on the search task (for which a response was 
required on every trial), thereby neglecting to look out for, and/or make a response 
to the CS. By contrast, the low load search task was not so difficult, and therefore 
doing both tasks simultaneously was less demanding, rendering goal-neglect less 
likely.
It should be noted, however, that one of the conditions engendering goal- 
neglect, according to Duncan et al. (1996), is a lack of strong external cues 
reinforcing task goals. In the paradigm I have employed, a question mark or the 
word ‘spot?’ was presented in every trial following the search task, potentially 
acting as a powerful and consistent reminder of the detection task. On the other 
hand, since it appeared in every trial, participants may have become habituated to 
its presence and have learned to ignore it to some extent.
Furthermore, De Jong et al. (1999) posit that in a situation in which trials 
occur rapidly, as they do here, goal-neglect is less likely to occur.4 Indeed, one of 
the manipulations De Jong et al. (1999) used to induce goal-neglect was slowing 
the rate of trials (so that participants’ minds might stray from task goals), and this 
was compared with a fast trial rate condition in which goal-neglect did not occur. 
With the experiments I report here, trials were always presented at a rapid rate, 
another feature of the experimental paradigm that discouraged goal-neglect.
4 Note that although the stimuli in each trial were presented rapidly in the experiments reported by 
Duncan et al. (1996) and yet goal-neglect still occurred, the task requirement that was neglected 
only had to be performed once in each 8 s trial, i.e., at a slow rate.
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In addition to aspects of the methodology suggesting goal-neglect an 
unlikely incidence, the pattern of responses also does not support a goal-neglect 
interpretation. The phenomenon almost exclusively involves a complete disregard 
of the neglected task until it is entirely alleviated by an environmental prompt (e.g., 
verbal feedback) that it must be performed (Duncan et al., 1996). The data 
presented here, however, are such that CS detection responses in the high 
perceptual load condition occur uniformly across blocks of trials throughout the 
experiment, rather than spontaneously starting at some point after a complete lack 
of responses for a period of time. Furthermore, participants who exhibited goal- 
neglect in Duncan et al.’s (1996) study did not find the neglected task difficult and 
had no problems in performing it to a high degree of accuracy after being reminded 
of the task goals. The participants who undertook the experiments reported here, on 
the other hand, frequently remarked that they had found detecting the CS very 
difficult in the high perceptual load condition, despite actively looking for it. In 
spite of these arguments against a goal-neglect interpretation, however, it is 
important to rule it out as a confound empirically.
In order to prevent the occurrence of goal-neglect, four different measures 
were taken to raise the priority of the detection task. In Experiment 4 the order of 
responses was reversed so that the detection response was made immediately upon 
the appearance of the CS, before the search task response, whereas in all of the 
previous experiments it had been made after the search task response. In 
Experiment 5 the probability of CS presentation was increased. In Experiment 6 an 
absent response was introduced such that participants responded either present or 
absent on each trial, making a detection response on every trial rather than only 
when the CS had been detected. In Experiment 7 the increase in CS probability and
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absent response manipulations were combined. In Experiment 8 the location 
uncertainty of the CS was decreased by presenting it in two locations rather than 
six. This experiment additionally rules out an account of the results in terms of low 
expectancy (i.e., a high location uncertainty).
As well as increasing the priority of the detection task in order to counter 
alternative accounts in terms of goal-neglect, the manipulation of reversing the 
order of responses in Experiment 4 also serves as the strongest test of memory- 
based accounts of the results. Since the detection response came before the search 
response, it could be made immediately upon presentation of the CS, with no delay 
at all, thus minimising the possibility that the CS would be forgotten. As I reviewed 
in the General Introduction, an account of inattentional blindness in terms of 
forgetting the CS rather than not perceiving it has been proposed by a number of 
authors, most notably Wolfe (1999), who proposed the inattentional amnesia 
hypothesis to explain the phenomenon of inattentional blindness, pointing out that 
participants are questioned a relatively long time after the offset of the stimulus and 
so rather than having not seen it, may have simply forgotten it had been there. 
Alternatively, the CS may have never been encoded into memory at all (Moore, 
2001; Moore & Egeth, 1997) or may have only generated a weak signal that could 
be easily wiped out of memory during the delay incurred by making the search 
response. According to such accounts, the effects of perceptual load on detection 
could reflect forgetting or diminished encoding of the CS into memory instead of, 
or in addition to, reduced awareness of the CS.
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3.1 Experiment 4
If goal-neglect is the cause of the effect of perceptual load on CS detection, then 
increasing the priority of the CS detection task will reduce or eliminate the effect. 
One aspect of the CS detection task that may affect the priority that participants 
assign to it is the fact that the CS detection response is collected after the search 
response. In Experiment 4, therefore, the order of responses was reversed, so that 
the CS detection response was made first, before the search response, in order to 
raise its priority.
This manipulation also precludes an alternative account of the results in 
terms of memory, since the detection response was immediate. Equating the time 
available for preparation of the detection response in Experiment 3 ruled out most 
of the potentially confounding effects of differential search RTs in the low and high 
load conditions. However, since the detection response in Experiment 3 was made 
after the search response, an account of the results in terms of memory failure 
remains possible: although the same time interval elapsed between the presentation 
of the stimuli and the detection response in the low and high perceptual load 
conditions, the participants’ attention was more engaged in processing the search 
task during that interval in the high load than in the low load condition. This may 
have reduced the depth of encoding of the CS into memory (where it had to be 
retained until the CS response could be made) in the high relative to the low load 
condition. It is therefore important to assess the effects of perceptual load on 
detection sensitivity in a design in which participants are asked to make the 
detection response immediately upon its presentation, i.e., before the search task 
response, rather than after it, as in the previous experiments.
53
3.1.1 Method
P artic ipan ts. Twenty-two new participants were recruited from UCL and 
were paid for their participation. Two participants were replaced because their 
accuracy on the letter search task was below 65%, and two because they detected 
less than 75% of the CS in the control block. The age range of those included was 
18 to 39 years (M =  21.4 years, S D  =  5.2 years) and there were 10 men.
Stim uli a n d  P rocedure. The apparatus, stimuli, and procedure were the 
same as Experiment 1, except that the participants were instructed to make the 
detection response first, as soon as they saw the CS, and to respond to the letter 
search task afterwards. If they did not see the CS, they were to respond to the letter 
search task as quickly and accurately as they could. A single 2.7 s interval was 
available to make both responses.
3.1.2 Results and Discussion
L etter  Search. As the detection response was made before the search 
response, trials in which the CS was presented were excluded from the mean search 
RT analysis, since making a detection response before the search response would 
have greatly delayed search RT. The perceptual load manipulation was again 
effective: mean search RT was significantly longer in the high perceptual load 
condition (M =  766 ms) than the low perceptual load condition ( M — 640 ms), F (l, 
20) = 5.57, M SE  = 15,728.47, p  = .029, r|p2 = .22, and error rate in the high 
perceptual load condition (M =  21.2%) was significantly higher than in the low 
perceptual load condition (.M =  6.2%), F (l, 20) = 39.46, M SE  -  31.36 , p  < .001, r|p2 
=  .66.
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C S  D etection . Mean percentage detection and false alarm rates, and mean d ’ 
and p for correct search trials only as a function of perceptual load are presented in 
Table 4.
Table 4. Mean (and SD) Percentage Detection and False Alarm Rates and Mean (and SD) d ’ and P 
as a Function of Perceptual Load in Experiment 4.
Perceptual load Detection rate %
False alarm 
rate % d ' p
Low 71.7 (36.5) 1.8 (2.3) 3.10 (1.29) 7.74 (9.42)
High 40.6 (25.3) 1.3 (2.4) 1.98 (0.81) 14.14 (8.84)
As with the experiments in Chapter 2, detection rate and d ’ were 
significantly lower in the high load than low load condition, F (l, 20) = 5.44, M SE  
= 982.61,/? = .030, ?ip2 = .21 andF(l, 20) = 6.01, M SE  =  1.16,/? = .024, t|p2 = .23 
for load effects on detection rate and d \  respectively. The figures for mean p 
revealed a numerical trend towards a more stringent criterion in the high load than 
the low load but the difference was not significant, F (1, 20) = 2.69, M SE  = 83.50,/? 
= .117, r(p = .12. Experiment 4, therefore, replicated the perceptual load effect on 
CS detection found in Experiments 1-3, even though the order of responses was 
reversed so that the detection response came before the search response. The fact 
that in this experiment participants did not have to delay their detection response 
until after they had made the search response rules out alternative accounts of the 
results in terms of a perceptual load effect on memory rather than on detection 
sensitivity.
The E ffect o f  R eversin g  the O rd er o f  R esponses. The results of this
experiment were compared with those of Experiment 2 in a series of two way
ANOVA with perceptual load and order of responses as factors. As would be
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expected, there was a main effect of perceptual load on both detection rate, F (l, 34) 
= 18.62, M SE  = 889.49,p  < .001, iip2 = .35, and d ’, F ( 1, 34) = 28.81, M SE  =  1.30, p  
<  .001, r\p =  .40; however, there was no main effect of order of responses on 
either, both F  <  1. There was also no interaction: reversing the order of responses 
so that the detection response came first did not affect the modulation by perceptual 
load, since mean detection rate (71.7% and 40.6% for low and high perceptual 
load, respectively) and mean detection sensitivity (3.10 and 1.98 for low and high, 
respectively) were not significantly different to those of Experiment 2 (90.0% and 
36.8%, and 3.70 and 1.30 for low and high, respectively), F (1, 34) = 1.28, M SE  =  
889.49, p  = .265, r\p2 = .04 for detection rate, F (l, 34) = 2.92, M SE  =  1.30,/? =
.097, rjp2 = .08 for d \  There were no significant effects on p, F (l, 34) = 2.40, M SE  
= 93.06,/? = .131, rjp2 = .07 for the main effect of perceptual load, F {1, 34) = 1.37, 
M SE  = 93.06, /? = .249, riP2 = .04 for the main effect of order of responses, and F  <
1 for the interaction.
It is somewhat surprising that the overall mean detection rate in this 
experiment (56.1%) was lower than in Experiment 2 (63.4%, albeit not 
significantly so, and M d ’ was very similar: 2.54 and 2.50), considering that the 
detection response was now prioritised by being made first, before the search 
response. This may reflect a response switch-cost incurred when participants had to 
suppress the more frequent, and therefore dominant search response, to make way 
for the relatively infrequent detection response. Such a cost could have resulted in
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participants failing to make a detection response in some of the CS trials, and 
therefore may have reduced the rate of CS detection in this experiment.5
3.2 Experiment 5
In Experiment 4, alternative accounts of the results in terms of goal-neglect and 
memory failure were countered by having the detection response first, before the 
search response, thereby raising the priority of the detection task and eliminating 
the delay between CS presentation and response. The somewhat unexpected trend 
for a decrease in overall mean detection rate with the detection response made first 
indicates that there may have been a response switching cost, however. In 
Experiment 5, therefore, the order of responses was restored to that of Experiments 
1-3, with the detection response following the search response.
In all the previous experiments the CS was presented in 17% of trials. 
Experiment 5 examined whether the perceptual load of the search task would 
determine detection performance when the CS was presented more frequently, in 
this case, in 50% of trials. More frequent presentations of the CS should raise the 
priority of the detection task, as participants’ expectations that a CS would appear 
in any given trial would be greater. Furthermore, it might be expected that 
increasing the frequency of CS presentation would result in better detection
5 Importantly though, as such failures of response inhibition are likely to have had similar effects on 
detection in the low and high perceptual load conditions, such an effect can not serve as an 
alternative account of the effect of perceptual load on detection.
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sensitivity, since it would increase participants’ familiarity with the CS and give 
them much more practice at the task during the experiment.
3.2.1 Method
P artic ipan ts. Eighteen new participants were recruited from the website, 
www.gumtree.com and were paid for their participation. Eight participants were 
replaced because they detected less than 75% of the CS in the control block, and 
two because their mean search RTs were greater than 2 S D  above the group mean. 
The age range of those included was 18 to 36 years ( M — 24.5 years, S D  = 4.7 
years) and there were 10 men.
Stim uli a n d  P rocedure. The apparatus, stimuli, and procedure were the 
same as Experiment 2 except that the CS was presented in 36 of the 72 trials (50%) 
per block. In each block the CS was presented six times in each of its six possible 
positions. A fully counterbalanced set of 144 different stimulus displays, employed 
across two blocks of 72 trials, consisted of each of the target letters (two) in each of 
the letter circle positions (six), either without or with the CS in each position (six). 
In the high perceptual load condition there were also 144 randomly selected non­
target arrangements. The control block used half of the displays from the first block 
and half from the second block.
3.2.2 Results and Discussion
L etter  Search. As with the previous experiments, mean search RT was 
significantly longer in the high perceptual load condition ( M =  816 ms) than in the 
low (M =  664 ms), F (l, 16) = 7.13, M SE  = 14,683.60, p  = .017, r|p2 = .31, and error 
rate in the high perceptual load condition (M =  27.3%) was significantly higher
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than in the low ( M =  9.0%), F ( l ,  16) = 16.24, M SE  = 93.13, p <  .001, r|p2 = .50. 
Perceptual load was therefore again successfully increased with the manipulation of 
search set size in Experiment 5.
C S  D etection . Mean percentage detection and false alarm rates, and mean d’ 
and p for correct search trials only as a function of perceptual load are presented in 
Table 5.
Table 5. Mean (and SD) Percentage Detection and False Alarm Rates and Mean (and SD) d ’ and P 
as a Function of Perceptual Load in Experiment 5.
Perceptual load Detection rate %
False alarm 
rate % d ’ P
Low 90.0 (9.1) 4.1 (5.2) 3.41 (l.oo) 2.75 (2.36)
High 61.4 (26.3) 12.4 (19.0) 2.03 (1.19) 6.90 (7.25)
As the table suggests, detection rate in the high perceptual load condition 
was significantly lower than in the low perceptual load condition, F ( 1, 16) = 9.46, 
M SE =  387.81, p  = .007, r|p = .37. Detection sensitivity was also again 
significantly lower for the high than low perceptual load condition, F (l, 16) = 7.02, 
M SE  = 1.21, p  = .017, rjp = .31. p was not significantly different between the low 
and high load conditions, F ( 1,16) = 2.67, M SE  =  29.07, p  = .122, rjp2 = .14.
The E ffect o f  C S  Frequency. The results of this experiment were compared
with those of Experiment 2 (in which CS frequency was 17%) in a series of two
way ANOVA with perceptual load and CS frequency as factors. As would be
expected, there was a main effect of perceptual load on both detection rate, F (l, 30)
= 25.39, M SE  = 559.84, p  < .001, qp2 = .46, and d \  F (1, 30) = 22.48, M S E  =  1.35, p
< .001, rjp2 = .43. There was no main effect of CS frequency, F (l, 30) = 2.24, M SE
=  559.84, p  = .145, rjp2 = .07 for detection rate, F  <  1 for d \  and critically, there
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was no interaction between perceptual load and CS frequency, indicating that the 
effect of perceptual load was not significantly different between experiments, F (l, 
30) = 2.33, M SE  =  559.84, p  =  .137, iiP2 = .07 for detection rate, F ( l ,  30) = 1.66, 
M SE  = 1.35,/) = .208, riP2 = .05 for d ’. The higher frequency of CS presentation in 
this experiment did lead to numerical trends for an increase in both mean detection 
rate (61.4%) and mean d ’ (2.03) in the high load condition compared with the same 
condition in Experiment 2 (36.8% and 1.30), but in paired comparisons these trends 
did not reach significance, t( 15) = 1.72, S E M =  14.28,/? = .106 for detection rate, 
/(15) = 1.10, S E M =  0.66,/? = .287 for d \  Detection performance in the low load 
remained the same ( M detection rate = 90.0% and M d ’ =  3.41 in Experiment 5 
compared to 90.0% and 3.70 in Experiment 2, t  <  1 for both). There were no 
significant effects on p, F (l, 30) = 1.87, M SE  = 65.34,/? = .182, r|p2 = .06 for the 
main effect of perceptual load, F  <  1 for both the main effect of CS frequency and 
the interaction between CS frequency and perceptual load.
These results clearly demonstrate that perceptual load determines conscious 
perception even when the CS has a high frequency of occurrence, appearing in 50% 
of trials rather than 17%, as in the previous experiments.
3.3 Experiment 6
In Experiment 5, increasing the frequency of CS presentation raised the priority of 
the detection task but did not affect detection sensitivity. Another way of raising 
the priority of the detection task is to introduce an absent response, such that 
participants make a detection response on every trial. This was the design of 
Experiment 6. As with Experiment 5, this change should raise the priority of the 
detection task without influencing the effect of perceptual load.
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3.3.1 Method
P artic ipan ts. Eighteen new participants were recruited via the website, 
www.gumtree.com and were paid for their participation. Fifteen participants were 
replaced because they detected less than 75% of the CS in the control block, 10 
because their accuracy at the search task was below 65%, and one because his false 
alarm rate in both the experimental blocks and the control blocks was 80%. The 
age range of those included was 20 to 44 years (M =  25.1 years, S D  = 5.9 years) 
and there were eight men.
Stim uli a n d  P rocedure. The apparatus, stimuli, and procedure were the 
same as Experiment 2, except that participants were instructed to press the ‘A ’ key 
when the CS was absent and press the ‘S’ key when it was present. In addition, a 
minor procedural change was made -  the question mark signifying that the 
detection response could be made was now presented for the full 2 s response 
interval with no blank following it.
3.3.2 Results and Discussion
L etter  Search. As with the previous experiments, mean search RT was 
significantly longer in the high perceptual load condition (M =  879 ms) than the 
low perceptual load condition (.M =  644 ms), F (l, 16) = 10.69, M SE  =  23,208.80,/? 
= .005, rjp2 = .40, and error rate in the high perceptual load condition (M = 20.4%) 
was significantly higher than in the low perceptual load condition (M = 8.6%), F (l, 
16) = 12.75, M SE  =  49.90, p  =  .003, rjp2 = .44, indicating that the perceptual load of 
the search task was again successfully increased with the manipulation of search set 
size in Experiment 6.
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C S  D etection . Mean percentage detection and false alarm rates, and mean d ’ 
and P for correct search trials only as a function of perceptual load are presented in 
Table 6.
Table 6. Mean (and SD) Percentage Detection and False Alarm Rates and Mean (and SD) d ’ and P 
as a Function of Perceptual Load in Experiment 6.
Perceptual load Detection rate %
False alarm 
rate % d ’ P
Low 84.5 (11.5) 3.1 (2.7) 3.08 (0.76) 4.71 (4.73)
High 55.6 (30.0) 28.6 (21.3) 0.99 (0.68) 3.10 (4.61)
Participants in the high perceptual load condition were significantly less 
likely to detect the CS than those in the low perceptual load condition, F (l, 16) =
7.34, M SE  =511.76,p  = .015, r|p2 = .31, and d ’ in the high perceptual load 
condition was also significantly lower than that in the low perceptual load 
condition, F (1, 16) = 37.77, M SE  = 0.52, p  <  .001, r)p2 = .70. p was not significantly 
different between the low and high load conditions, F <  1. These results replicate 
the previous pattern of results found in Experiments 1-5.
CS detection in the control block, in which participants did not perform the 
letter search task was again equivalent in the low and high perceptual load 
conditions in terms of detection rate (M =  91.7% for low load and 90.7% for high 
load, F <  1) and p (M =  4.96 for low load and 2.85 for high load, F (l, 16) = 1.84, 
M SE  =  10.84,p  =  0.193, rjp2 = .10); however, d ’ was significantly reduced, F ( 1, 16) 
= 7.54, M SE  = 0.35,/? = 0.014, r|p2 = .32, in the high load (M = 2.83) compared to 
the low load (M= 3.59). This was due to a greater number of false alarms (M =
1.1% for low load and 8.9% for high load). However, d ’ for the high load control 
block remained significantly higher than d ’ for the high load experimental blocks,
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F (l, 8) = 64.93, M SE  =  0.23, p  < .001, r|p2 = .89, showing that the effect of 
perceptual load depends on actual performance of the search task.
The E ffect o f  R equ irin g  a  D etection  R espon se on E very  T ria l (E ither  
P resen t o r  A bsen t). The results of this experiment were compared with those of 
Experiment 2 (in which detection responses were only made when the CS was 
present) in a series of two way ANOVA with perceptual load and CS response 
requirement as factors. As would be expected, there was a main effect of perceptual 
load on both detection rate, F (1, 30) = 22.89, M SE  = 625.95,p  < .001, r|p2 = .43, 
and d \ F ( 1, 30) = 43.82, M SE  = 0.98, p  <  .001, r|p2 = .59. Raising the priority of the 
detection task by introducing an absent response produced a small but non­
significant increase in overall mean detection rate (from 63.4% in Experiment 2 to 
70.1% in Experiment 6, F  <  1), but overall mean detection sensitivity showed a 
trend towards a decrease (from a d ’ o f  2.50 in Experiment 2 to a d ’ of 2.04, also not 
significant, F (l, 30) = 1.86, M SE  = 0.98,p  = .183, r|p2 = .06). This was due to an 
increase in the overall mean false alarm rate from 5.2% in Experiment 2 to 15.9% 
in Experiment 6, F (l, 30) = 5.72, M SE  = 169.63, p  = .023, r|p2 = .16. Adding a 
requirement to make a detection response in every trial therefore tended to increase 
the rate of present responses; however, since both detection rate and false alarm 
rate increased, detection sensitivity did not also increase. There was a numerical 
trend for a decrease in the effect of perceptual load (M  detection rate reduced by 
28.9% under high perceptual load in Experiment 6 compared to 53.2% in 
Experiment 2, M d ’ reduced by 2.09 in Experiment 6 compared to 2.40 in 
Experiment 2), but there was no significant interaction of perceptual load by CS 
response requirement for either detection rate, F (1, 30) = 2.03, M S E  = 625.95, p  =  
.165, rjp2 = .06, or d \  F  <  1, although there was for false alarm rate, F ( 1, 30) =
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5.03, M SE  = 169.63,/? = .032, r|p2 = .14. Further analyses revealed that false alarm 
rate in the high load condition of Experiment 6 was higher (M =  28.6%) than in 
Experiment 2 (M =  7.9%), f(15) = 2.34, S E M =  8.85, p  =  .033, although this did not 
produce a significant decrease in detection sensitivity (M =  0.99 in Experiment 6 
compared to 1.30 in Experiment 2, t < 1), due to a trend for a countering increase in 
detection rate (from M =  36.8% in Experiment 2 to 55.6% in Experiment 6, /(15) = 
1.25, S E M =  15.13,/? = .230). Performance in the low load condition in the two 
experiments, however, was comparable: M detection rate = 84.5% compared to 
90.0% in Experiment 2, t  <  1; M false alarm rate = 3.1% compared to 2.5%, t <  1; 
and M d ’ =  3.08 compared to 3.70, /(15) = 1.62, S E M =  0.38,/? = .125. There were 
no significant effects on P, F (l, 30) = 1.52, M SE  = 61.44,/? = .227, rjp2 = .05 for the 
main effect of CS response requirement, F  < 1 for both the main effect of 
perceptual load and the interaction between perceptual load and CS response 
requirement.
The trend towards an increase in detection rate and the significant increase 
in false alarm rate in the high load condition of Experiment 6 indicate that 
participants made more present responses than in Experiment 2 (and this carried 
over into the control block, hence the lower d ’ due to an increase in false alarms). 
Thus, introducing an absent response, thereby raising the priority of the detection 
task, led to a trend for a reduction in response criterion (i.e., a greater likelihood of 
making a present response) in the high load condition, from M  p = 8.95 in 
Experiment 2 to A/p = 3.10 (although this was not significant, t( 15) = 1.48, S E M =  
3.94,/? = .159). However, as reported above, there was no change in detection 
sensitivity. Such an increase in the proportion of present responses, producing a 
trend for a rise in detection rate and a significant rise in false alarm rate, and hence
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not improving detection sensitivity, indicates that the manipulation of adding an 
absent response did indeed have the desired effect of raising the priority of the 
detection task, but clearly the effect of perceptual load on detection did not depend 
on task priority, since it was unaffected.
3.4 Experiment 7
In Experiment 7, the manipulations used to increase the priority of the detection 
task in the previous two experiments were combined. The CS was therefore 
presented in 50% of trials, as in Experiment 5, and the participants made a 
detection response on every trial, either ‘present’ or ‘absent’, as in Experiment 6.
3.4.1 Method
P artic ipan ts. Sixteen new participants were recruited from UCL and were 
paid for their participation. Five participants were replaced because their accuracy 
on the letter search task was below 65%, four because they detected less than 75% 
of the CS in the control block, and two because their mean search RT was either 
two standard deviations above or below the group mean. The age range of those 
included was 18 to 26 years (M =  20.0 years, S D  = 2.3 years) and there were five 
men.
Stim uli a n d  P rocedure. The apparatus, stimuli, and procedure were the 
same as those used in Experiment 6, except that the CS was presented in 36 of the 
72 trials (50%) per block.
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3.4.2 Results and Discussion
L etter  Search. As with the previous experiments, a longer mean search RT 
and a greater proportion of errors were found in the high perceptual load condition 
(M =  870  ms and M =  2 3 .7 % ) than the low perceptual load condition ( M =  533 ms 
and M =  10.9%), F ( 1,14) = 64.69, M SE =  7026.05, p  < .001, tip2 = .82 for RT, F ( 1, 
14) = 12.24, M SE  = 54.17, p  =  .004, tip2 = .47 for error rate.
C S D etection . The mean percentage detection and false alarm rates and 
mean d ’ and p for correct search task trials only as a function of perceptual load are 
presented in Table 7.
Table 7. Mean (and SD) Percentage Detection and False Alarm Rates and Mean (and SD) d ’ and P 
as a Function of Perceptual Load in Experiment 7.
Perceptual load Detection rate %
False alarm 
rate % d ’ P
Low 92.3 (6.0) 4.7 (4.9) 3.38 (0.72) 2.17 (1.43)
High 64.1 (19.5) 14.9 (10.0) 1.61 (0.88) 3.52 (6.01)
As an inspection of the table reveals, the effect of perceptual load on 
detection rate and d ’ was replicated in Experiment 7, F ( l ,  14) = 15.32, M SE  =
208.34,p  = .002, T|p2 = .52 for detection rate, F ( \ ,  14) = 19.58, M SE  = 0.64, p  = 
.001, r|p = .58 for d ’. P did not differ between the low and high load conditions, F  
<  1. Experiment 7 therefore demonstrates that perceptual load reduces detection 
rate and sensitivity even when two manipulations designed to increase the priority 
of the detection task were combined: increasing the frequency of CS presentation 
from 17% to 50% of trials, and collecting present and absent responses rather than 
just present responses.
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The E ffect o f  C S  F requ en cy When R equ irin g  a  D e tec tio n  R esp o n se  on  
E very  T rial (E ither P resen t o r  A bsent). The results of this experiment were 
compared with those of Experiment 6 (in which CS frequency was 17% but 
detection responses were required on every trial) in a series of two way ANOVA 
with perceptual load and CS frequency as factors. As would be expected, there was 
a main effect of perceptual load on both detection rate, F (l, 30) = 18.68, M SE  = 
370.17,p  < .001, rip2 = .38, and d \  F (l, 30) = 54.75, M SE  =  0 . 5 i , p  <  .001, r|p2 = 
.65. But there was no main effect of CS frequency for either, F (l, 30) = 1.52, M SE  
= 370.17,p  = .228, r|p2 = .05 for detection rate, F { 1, 30) = 3.06, M SE  = 0.58,/? = 
.091, T|p2 = .09 for d \  The increase in CS frequency from 17% to 50% with the 
present or absent detection response design led to non-significant trends in the high 
load condition for a higher detection rate ( M =  64.1% in Experiment 7 vs. 55.6% in 
Experiment 6, t  <  1), and a higher d ’ (M =  1.61 in Experiment 7 vs. 0.99 in 
Experiment 6, /(15) = 1.63, S E M =  0.38,p  =  .124), as it did in Experiment 5, 
although this time the low load condition data followed the same trend for an 
increase: M  detection rate = 92.3% in Experiment 7 vs. 84.5% in Experiment 6, 
t( 15)= 1.73, S E M =  4.53,/? = .105, and M d ’ =  3.38 in Experiment 7 vs. 3.08 in 
Experiment 6, t  < 1. Again, however, as with Experiment 5, there was no 
interaction of perceptual load and CS frequency, F  <  1 for both detection rate and 
d \  so the effect of perceptual load was not reduced in this experiment. There were 
no significant effects on p, all F  < 1.
These results demonstrate that perceptual load determines detection rate and 
sensitivity even when the detection task has a higher priority due to an increase in 
the probability of the CS being presented and the fact that participants were 
required to make a detection response on every trial (either present or absent).
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3.5 Experiment 8
In all the experiments so far, the CS was presented in one of six possible locations. 
Experiment 8 examined whether the perceptual load of the search task would 
determine detection sensitivity even when the CS was presented in one of only two 
locations, either on the left or the right side of the circle of letters. In a similar way 
to increasing the frequency of presentation of the CS (as in Experiments 5 and 7), 
reducing the possible number of CS locations ought to raise the priority of 
detection since the expectancy that the CS will appear in each location will 
necessarily increase (i.e., the probability that the CS would appear in each of the 
six locations on any given trial in Experiments 5 and 7 was 0.08, whereas with two 
locations it would be 0.25).
It is known that reducing location uncertainty can significantly increase the 
probability of stimulus detection (e.g., Bashinski & Bacharach, 1980; Posner, 
Nissen, & Ogden; 1978; Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 1980). This enhancement of 
detection may, at least in part, be due simply to the reduced probability of false 
alarms (Davies, Kramer, & Graham, 1983). However, attention may also play a 
role, as many studies have demonstrated a better ability to focus spatial attention 
with reduced location uncertainty (e.g., Posner et al., 1978, 1980).
It is therefore possible that with reduced uncertainty of CS location, 
participants would be able to pay focused attention to it, even in conditions of high 
perceptual load. Previous tests of perceptual load theory, however, have often 
demonstrated that high perceptual load eliminates the processing of an irrelevant 
stimulus presented in one of two possible locations (e.g., Lavie, 1995; Lavie &
Cox, 1997; Lavie & Fox, 2000), although these studies inferred perception from the 
congruency and negative priming effects of an irrelevant distractor stimulus on
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search RTs. Nevertheless, Experiment 8 should replicate the effect of perceptual 
load on the detection of the CS found in the previous experiments, when the CS is 
presented in just one of two possible locations.
3.5.1 Method
P artic ipan ts. Forty new participants were recruited from UCL and were 
paid for their participation. Two participants were replaced because they detected 
less than 75% of the CS in the control block, one because his accuracy at the letter 
search task was below 65%, and one because his false alarm rate in the control 
blocks was 61%. The age range of those included was 18 to 40 years (M =  22.9 
years, SD  = 5.0 years) and there were 11 men.
S tim uli a n d  P rocedure. The apparatus, stimuli, and procedure were 
identical to Experiment 7 except that the CS was presented at one of two locations, 
one on the left and one on the right of the circle of letters on the horizontal midline, 
both 5.4° of visual angle from the fixation point. In each block the CS was 
presented 18 times in each of its two possible positions, three times in each position 
for each of the six possible target positions. A counterbalanced set of 144 different 
stimulus displays consisted of each of the target letters (two) in each of the letter 
circle positions (six), as well as the CS in each position (two). In the high 
perceptual load condition there were also 144 randomly selected non-target 
arrangements.
3.5.2 Results and Discussion
L etter  Search. As with the previous experiments, perceptual load was 
effectively manipulated with the increased search set size: mean search RT was
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significantly longer in the high perceptual load condition ( M =  932 ms) than the 
low perceptual load condition (M =  699 ms), F (l, 38) = 20.84, M SE  = 25,834.57, p  
< .001, r\p2 =  .35, and error rate in the high perceptual load condition (M =  23.3%) 
was significantly higher than in the low perceptual load condition (M =  8.4%), F ( 1, 
38) = 47.57, M SE  =  46.98, p  <  .001, riP2 = .56.
C S D etection . Table 8 shows mean percentage detection and false alarm 
rates and mean d ’ and P for correct search trials only as a function of perceptual 
load.
Table 8. Mean (and SD) Percentage Detection and False Alarm Rates and Mean (and SD) d ’ and (3 
as a Function of Perceptual Load in Experiment 8.
Perceptual load Detection rate %
False alarm 
rate % d ’ P
Low 87.3 (12.0) 7.5 (8.8) 3.02 (1.06) 2.31 (2.88)
High 75.5 (23.2) 22.2 (15.4) 1.70 (0.78) 1.48 (2.04)
Detection rate and d ’ were again significantly lower in the high load than 
low load condition, F ( 1, 38) = 4.11, M SE  = 342.19,/? = .050, rjp2 = .10 andF (l, 38) 
= 20.29, M SE  =  0.87, p  <  .001, r\p2 = .35, respectively, even though the CS was 
now presented in one of two locations rather than in one of six as had been the case 
in all previous experiments, p was no different between conditions, F ( 1, 38) = 1.15, 
M SE  = 6.23, p  = .291, r)p2 = .03.
The E ffect o f  L oca tion  U ncertainty. Since Experiments 7 and 8 employed
the same stimuli and procedure, the only difference being the location uncertainty
of the CS, between-experiment comparisons were conducted in a series of two way
ANOVA with perceptual load and location uncertainty as factors. As would be
expected, there was a main effect of perceptual load on both detection rate, F (l, 52)
70
= 15.01, M SE  =  306.15, p  <  .001, r|p2 = .22, and d \ F (l, 52) = 33.97, M SE  =  0.81, p  
< .001, rip2 = .40. The main effect of reducing location uncertainty from six 
locations in Experiment 7 ( M detection rate = 78.2%, M d ’ = 2.50) to two locations 
in Experiment 8 ( M detection rate = 81.4%, M d ’ =  2 3 6 )  was not significant for 
either detection rate or d ’, F  < 1 for both. Moreover, the effect of perceptual load 
on detection did not differ significantly between Experiment 7 (in which M  
detection rate was reduced by 28.2%, M d ’ by 1.77) and Experiment 8 (in which M  
detection rate was reduced by 11.8%, M d ’ by 1.32), F (l, 52) = 2.51, M SE  =
306.15, p  = .119, rjp = .05 for detection rate, F  <  1 for d ’, despite a numerical trend 
towards a reduction in the perceptual load effect. There were no significant effects 
on p, F  < 1 for the main effect of perceptual load, F ( 1, 52) =1.11, M SE  = 9.65, p  = 
.297, r|p2 = .02 for the main effect of location uncertainty, and F (1, 52) = 1.44, M SE  
= 9 .6 5 ,p  = .235, rjp2 = .03 for the interaction.
These results clearly demonstrate that perceptual load determines conscious 
awareness even when the CS has a high location certainty, appearing in just one of 
two possible locations, as in previous perceptual load studies using indirect 
measures of distractor processing.
3.6 Chapter Conclusions
The experiments in this chapter have demonstrated that goal-neglect is not 
responsible for the effect of perceptual load on CS detection. With four different 
manipulations designed to increase the priority of the detection task, both detection 
rate and detection sensitivity were still significantly reduced under high perceptual 
load. The effect was found when the detection response was made immediately 
upon stimulus presentation, before the search task response (Experiment 4), when
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the frequency of CS presentation was increased (Experiments 5 and 7), when 
participants made a detection response (present or absent) on every trial 
(Experiments 6 and 7), and when location uncertainty was reduced by decreasing 
the number of locations in which the CS could be presented from six to two 
(Experiment 8).
Experiment 4 also convincingly ruled out memory based accounts of the 
results as the effect of perceptual load was demonstrated in a design in which the 
detection response was made immediately upon CS presentation rather than after 
the search task response, as it was in the other experiments.
The effect of perceptual load persisted when location uncertainty was 
decreased by presenting the CS in only two possible locations (Experiment 8), as in 
previous response competition experiments assessing the extent to which 
distractors were perceived (e.g., Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; Lavie, 1995).
Experiment 8 therefore ruled out an account of the results in terms of low 
expectancy, i.e., a high location uncertainty.
The findings therefore do not reflect an effect of perceptual load on goal- 
neglect or the priority of the detection task: the slight increases in detection rate in 
Experiments 5 to 8 did not translate into improvements in detection sensitivity, 
since they were accompanied by corresponding increases in false alarm rate.
Instead, the results demonstrate that the availability of limited capacity attention is 
critical for conscious perception, in direct support of the central tenet of perceptual 
load theory, namely, that the level of perceptual load in a task determines the extent 
to which task-irrelevant information is perceived.
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Chapter 4
Strategy
73
Since in all the experiments so far each participant undertook either the low or high 
perceptual load condition alone, an alternative account of the effect of perceptual 
load on detection sensitivity is that participants may have employed different 
strategies in the different perceptual load conditions. This is possible despite the 
task instructions being the same, i.e., search for a letter X or N and monitor for the 
presence of the CS, since the high perceptual load search task was considerably 
more difficult than the low load search task and therefore a different strategy may 
have had to have been adopted in order to be able to accomplish it. It is therefore 
possible that the use of a different strategy in the high perceptual load condition 
may have produced the poorer CS detection performance, rather than the demands 
on perceptual capacity placed by high perceptual load in the search task. One way 
to rule out an alternative account in terms of strategy, therefore, is to present each 
participant with trials of both levels of perceptual load in a randomly intermixed 
order, rather than exclusively either low or high perceptual load trials. With this 
design, participants can not prepare for one level of perceptual load or the other, 
and therefore can not employ a particular strategy. A design with randomly 
intermixed perceptual load trials has been adopted in several studies (Cartwright- 
Finch & Lavie, 2007; Lavie & Cox, 1997; Theewes, Kramer, & Belopolsky, 2004), 
each successfully ruling out differential strategies as an alternative explanation of 
the perceptual load effect, as I describe next.
Lavie and Cox (1997) presented participants with search tasks of four 
different levels of perceptual load by varying the number of non-targets in the 
search display: either zero, one, three or five different non-targets were added. The 
different perceptual load trials were presented in a randomly intermixed order and 
interference effects on RTs from a congruent or incongruent flanker distractor were
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significantly reduced when search set size was six compared to the other, smaller 
set sizes, implying that capacity may only be consumed when more than four items 
require focused attention.
Theeuwes et al. (2004) replicated the results of Lavie and Cox (1997) with 
just two levels of perceptual load, low (set size one) and high (set size six), rather 
than four. As with Lavie and Cox (1997), load trials were presented in a randomly 
intermixed order. An additional analysis looking at the level of load in the 
preceding trial as well as that in the current trial revealed that whereas the level of 
load on the preceding trial made no difference in a low load trial, only high load 
trials that followed high load trials showed a significantly reduced distractor effect 
on search RT.
Cartwright-Finch and Lavie (2007) presented participants with trials of low 
and high perceptual load in a randomly intermixed order and included a CS on the 
final trial, i.e., an inattentional blindness trial. Participants performing a high 
perceptual load search task on the final trial were more likely to fail to notice the 
CS than those performing a low perceptual load search task, thus ruling out 
differential strategies as an alterative account of the effect of perceptual load on 
conscious awareness, since the participants could not prepare for a low or high load 
trial since they could not anticipate which would occur from trial to trial.
In this chapter, before reporting an experiment with low and high perceptual 
load trials presented in a randomly intermixed order (Experiment 10), I first 
describe an experiment in which the conditions were blocked in a within-subjects 
design (Experiment 9), as opposed to the experiments in the previous chapters in 
which the conditions were manipulated between-subjects. This was done in order 
to first ascertain that the effect of perceptual load could be replicated when the
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participants experienced both levels of load. In both Experiments 9 and 10, the 
probability that the CS was presented on any given trial was 50%, as it had been in 
Experiments 5 and 7 in the previous chapter, and the total number of CS trials also 
remained the same in order to maintain the amount of experience participants 
would have in detecting the CS. In Experiment 11, the probability of CS 
presentation was reduced to 17% in order to see if there was any change in the 
effect of perceptual load on detection when there were fewer CS presented in each 
block of randomly intermixed load trials.
4.1 Experiment 9
So far, the conditions of low and high perceptual load had always been 
manipulated between-subjects such that each participant had either low or high 
perceptual load search task trials throughout the experiment. This design was used 
for the purpose of eliminating order and practice effects. It was important, 
however, to establish that the effects of load on detection can be found when it is 
manipulated within-subjects, as it has been previously with other paradigms (e.g., 
Lavie, 1995, with response competition, and Lavie and Fox, 2000, with negative 
priming). In Experiment 9, therefore, each participant carried out both conditions of 
low and high perceptual load.
4.1.1 Method
P artic ipan ts. Sixteen new participants were recruited from UCL and were 
paid for their participation. Five participants were replaced because they detected 
less than 75% of the CS in the control block, and seven because their accuracy at
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the letter search task was below 65%. The age range of those included was 18 to 32 
years { M =  23.0 years, S D  = 4.4 years) and there were seven men.
Stim uli a n d  P rocedure. The apparatus, stimuli, and procedure were the 
same as Experiment 7 except that participants were presented with two blocks of 
low perceptual load trials and two blocks of high perceptual load trials (order of 
blocks was counterbalanced: either ABBA or BAAB). A counterbalanced set of 
144 different stimulus displays, employed across four blocks of 36 trials each, 
consisted of each load condition (two), each of the target letters (two) in each of the 
letter circle positions (six), either without or with the CS in each position (six). In 
the high perceptual load condition there were also 72 randomly selected non-target 
arrangements. The control block used half of the displays from the first block and 
half from the second block. Note that the total number of trials in which the CS was 
presented (72) remained the same as in Experiment 7 to avoid confounding a 
comparison with that experiment with the effects of participants having more 
experience and practice at detecting the CS.
4.1.2 Results and Discussion
L etter  Search. Perceptual load was again successfully increased with the 
manipulation of search set size in Experiment 9: mean search RT was significantly 
longer in the high perceptual load condition (M  = 916 ms) than the low perceptual 
load condition ( M =  678 ms), F(l, 15) = 143.16, M SE  =  3156.38,p  < .001, t|p2 = 
.91, and error rate in the high perceptual load condition (M = 21.2%) was 
significantly higher than in the low perceptual load condition ( M =  7.5%), F ( 1, 15) 
= 106.19, M SE  = 14.12, p  <  .001, r\p2 = .88.
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C S  D etection . Mean percentage detection and false alarm rates, and mean d ’ 
and P for correct search trials only as a function of perceptual load are presented in 
Table 9.
Table 9. Mean (and SD) Percentage Detection and False Alarm Rates and Mean (and SD) d ’ and (3 
as a Function of Perceptual Load in Experiment 9.
Perceptual load Detection rate %
False alarm 
rate % d ’ P
Low 85.8 (19.8) 13.0 (12.0) 2.58 (0.98) 1.63 (i.9i)
High 72.8 (27.0) 19.0 (14.6) 1.79 (1.08) 1.73 (2.53)
In the high perceptual load condition, participants were less likely to detect 
the CS than in the low perceptual load condition, F ( 1, 15) = 8.28, M SE  =  169.57, p  
= .011, rjp = .36. Detection sensitivity ( d ’) was again significantly lower in the 
high perceptual load condition than in the low perceptual load condition, F(1, 15) =
a
18.19, M SE  =  0.28,/? = .001, r)p = .55. Response criterion (p) was not significantly 
different between the low and high load conditions, F  < 1. As each participant 
completed both conditions of low and high perceptual load in Experiment 9, two 
way ANOVA on detection rate and d ’ with perceptual load and order of blocks 
(ABBA or BAAB) as factors were carried out. Mean detection rate and d ’ for the 
order ABBA (where A is low perceptual load and B is high perceptual load) were 
higher than those for the order BAAB: 92.0% and 2.79 for low perceptual load, 
75.8% and 1.91 for high perceptual load for ABBA; 79.9% and 2.38 for low 
perceptual load, 69.6% and 1.68 for high perceptual load for BAAB. However, 
neither the main effect of order, nor the interaction between order and perceptual 
load was significant for either detection rate or d ’ (all F  <  1).
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Thus, Experiment 9 provides a successful replication of the effect of 
perceptual load on conscious detection using a design in which the level of load is 
manipulated within-subjects rather than between-subjects as it was in the previous 
experiments.
L o a d  M a n ip u la ted  W ithin-Subjects versu s B etw een -S u bjects. The effect of 
perceptual load on CS detection was somewhat smaller in this experiment than in 
Experiment 7 ( M d ’ reduced by 0.79 in Experiment 9, and by 1.77 in Experiment 
7). Whether this reduction was significant or not can not be ascertained statistically 
since within and between-subjects manipulations of the same independent variable 
can not be entered into a single analysis of variance. The reduced effect appears to 
be the result of poorer detection sensitivity in the low perceptual load condition in 
Experiment 9 { M d ’ = 2.58), compared to Experiment 7 (M d ’ = 3.38), mainly due 
to an increase in false alarm rate ( M -  13.0% in Experiment 9; 4.7% in Experiment 
7), but there was also a slight decrease in detection rate (M = 85.8% in Experiment 
9, and 92.3% in Experiment 7). Performances in the high load conditions of the two 
experiments were more similar to each other: M d ’ was 1.79 in Experiment 9, and 
1.61 in Experiment 7 (M  detection rate 72.8% in Experiment 9; 64.1% in 
Experiment 7, M  false alarm rate 19.0% in Experiment 9 and 14.9% in Experiment 
7), but there was, nevertheless, a small increase in sensitivity under high load 
conditions, which, coupled with the more sizeable decrease in the low load 
condition, led to the overall reduction in the perceptual load effect. The poorer low 
perceptual load performance was to some degree expected, however, since half the 
number of low perceptual load CS trials (36) were undertaken in this experiment 
compared to Experiment 7 (72, so that the total number of CS trials over the whole 
experiment remained the same). For this reason, despite the same 50% probability
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of CS presentation in this experiment and in Experiment 7, a more appropriate 
comparison when considering individual load conditions may be with Experiment 
6, in which the CS was presented with 17% probability (i.e., in 24 trials). Indeed, 
mean detection rate and mean d ’ in the low load condition in this experiment 
(85.8% and 2.58) were closer to those of Experiment 6 (84.5% and 3.08) than those 
of Experiment 7 (92.3% and 3.38).
4.2 Experiment 10
The purpose of Experiment 10 was to determine whether the effect of perceptual 
load on CS detection can be replicated in a design in which low and high 
perceptual load trials are presented in a randomly intermixed order. A replication 
with such a design would preclude alternative accounts of the results in terms of 
any potential differences in strategy employed by the participants in the two 
conditions of perceptual load. As with Experiment 9, the frequency of CS 
presentation was 50% for each condition of perceptual load and the participants 
made a CS detection response on every trial (either ‘present’ or ‘absent’).
4.2.1 Method
P artic ipan ts. Twenty-two new participants were recruited from UCL and 
were paid for their participation. Three participants were excluded and replaced 
because their accuracy on the letter search task was lower than 65%, and two 
because they detected less than 75% of the critical stimuli in the control block. The 
age range of those included was 18 to 25 years ( M =  20.4 years, S D  =1.7 years) 
and there were 13 men.
80
Stim uli a n d  P rocedure. The apparatus, stimuli and procedure were the same 
as Experiment 9 except that low and high perceptual load trials were presented in a 
randomly intermixed order within each block. A counterbalanced set of 144 
different stimulus displays, employed across two blocks of 72 trials, consisted of 
each load condition (two), each of the target letters (two) in each of the letter circle 
positions (six), either without or with the CS in each position (six). In the high 
perceptual load condition there were also 72 randomly selected non-target 
arrangements.
4.2.2 Results and Discussion
L etter  Search. As with the previous experiments, mean search RT was 
significantly longer (high load M =  857 ms; low load M =  674 ms) and error rate 
significantly higher (high load M =  21.3%; low load M =  6.0%) in the high 
perceptual load condition than the low perceptual load condition, F (l, 21) =
199.96, M SE  =  1844.82,p  < .001, tiP2 = .91 and F ( l ,  21) = 90.68, M S E  =  2 8 .2 9 ,p  <  
.001, T|p = .81, for RT and error rate, respectively. Thus perceptual load was 
successfully increased with the manipulation of search set size randomly 
intermixed within blocks.
C S  D etection . Mean percentage detection and false alarm rates and mean d ’ 
and p for correct search trials only as a function of perceptual load are presented in 
Table 10. Detection rate and d ’ were again significantly lower in the high load than 
low load condition, F (l, 21) = 4.61, M SE  =  145.89,/) = .044, iiP2 = .18 and F (l, 21) 
= 4.65, M SE  =  0.17,/) = .043, t)p2 = .18, for the load effect on detection rate and d \  
respectively. P was not significantly different between the low and high load 
conditions, F  < 1.
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Table 10. Mean (and SD) Percentage Detection and False Alarm Rates and Mean (and SD) d ’ and |3 
as a Function of Perceptual Load in Experiment 10.
Perceptual load Detection rate %
False alarm 
rate % d ’ P
Low 87.1 (12.4) 13.0 (19.3) 2.70 (1.06) 1.78 (1.67)
High 79.4 (16.8) 9.9 (10.4) 2.43 (l.oi) 2.21 (1.78)
Thus, Experiment 10 provides a successful replication of the effect of 
perceptual load on conscious detection using a design in which the level of load is 
randomly intermixed within each block of trials and hence precludes any strategy- 
based accounts of the results.
The E ffect o f  L o a d  From  the P rev iou s Trial. As mentioned in the Chapter 
Introduction, in a response competition study in which low and high perceptual 
load trials were presented in a randomly intermixed order, Theeuwes et al. (2004) 
found that whereas the level of load in the preceding trial made no difference in a 
low load trial, only high load trials that followed high load trials showed a 
significantly reduced distractor effect on search RTs. A similar analysis was 
conducted with the data from Experiment 10. Theeuwes et al.’s (2004) finding with 
indirect distractor effects was not replicated: two way ANOVA with load and load 
of previous trial as factors revealed a significant main effect of load on both 
detection rate and d \ F (  1, 21) = 5.01, M SE  = 281.96,/? = .036, rjp2 = .19 for 
detection rate, F ( 1, 21) = 6.18, M SE =  0.27,p  =  .021, rjp2 = .23 for d \  as would be 
expected, but no main effect of load of previous trial, F <  1 for both detection rate 
and d \  and no interaction, F  < 1 for detection rate, F ( 1, 21) = 1.26, M S E  = 0.30, p  
= .274, T|p = .06 for d \  In addition, in a third analysis on p there were no 
significant effects, F (l, 21) = 1.95, M SE  = 1.42,/? = .177, r)p2 = .09 for the main
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effect of load, and F  < 1 for both the main effect of load of the previous trial and 
the interaction.
In term ixed  L o a d  Versus B locked  Load. The results of this experiment were 
compared with those of Experiment 9, in which the perceptual load conditions were 
blocked, in a series of two way ANOVA with perceptual load and condition 
arrangement as factors. As would be expected, there was a main effect of 
perceptual load on both detection rate, F (l, 36) = 13.10, M SE  = 155.91,/? = .001, 
r|p2 = .27, and d \  F ( \ ,  36) = 24.22, M SE  = 0.22, p  < .001, r|p2 = .40. But there was 
no main effect of condition arrangement for either, F  < 1 for detection rate, F ( 1,
36) = 1.37, M SE  =  1.92,/? = .250, r|p2 = .04 for d \  The size of the perceptual load 
effect on detection rate in this experiment ( M -  7.7% decrease from low to high 
perceptual load) was smaller than that of Experiment 9 (M =  13.0% decrease from 
low to high load); however, this change was not significant, F  < 1. The perceptual 
load effect on detection sensitivity, however, was significantly smaller in this 
experiment ( M difference in d ’ = 0.27), compared with Experiment 9 ( M difference 
in d ’ = 0.79), F (l, 36) = 5.85, M SE  = 0.22,/? = .021, r|p2 = .14. Further inspection 
of the data reveals that performance in the low load condition was nearly identical 
in the two experiments: M detection rate was 87.1% and 85.8%, M false alarm rate 
for both was 13.0%, and M d ’ was 2.70 and 2.58 (for Experiments 10 and 9 
respectively), whereas performance in the high load condition was better in this 
experiment than in Experiment 9: M detection rate = 79.4% and 72.8%, M  false 
alarm rate 9.9% and 19.0%, and M d ’ = 2.43 and 1.79 (for Experiments 10 and 9 
respectively). The reduction in the perceptual load effect on detection sensitivity in 
Experiment 10 was therefore due to an improvement in detection performance in
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the high load condition rather than poorer performance in the low load condition 
compared to Experiment 9. There were no significant effects on p, all F  < 1.
4.3 Experiment 11
In Experiment 10, the effect of load was significantly reduced when load trials 
were presented in a randomly intermixed order and when the CS was presented in 
50% of trials. It is possible that with intermixed perceptual load trials the effect of 
load might be stronger when the CS is presented less frequently. Experiment 11, 
therefore, was the same as Experiment 10 in all respects except that the CS was 
presented in 17% of trials rather than 50%.
4.3.1 Method
P articipan ts. Twenty-two new participants were recruited from UCL and 
were paid for their participation. Ten participants were replaced because they 
detected less than 75% of the CS in the control block, four because their accuracy 
at the letter search task was lower than 65%, three because their mean letter search 
RT was either two SD  above or below the group mean, and one because her false 
alarm rate in the control blocks was 72%. The age range of those included was 19 
to 29 years (M = 22.0 years, SD  = 2.9 years) and there were seven men.
Stim uli a n d  P rocedure. The apparatus, stimuli, and procedure were the 
same as Experiment 10 except that the CS was presented in 17% of trials, and there 
were four blocks of 72 trials rather than two so that the number of trials in which 
the CS was presented per condition was not too low (i.e., 24 rather than 12).
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4.3.2 Results and Discussion
L etter  Search. Perceptual load was again successfully increased with the 
manipulation of search set size randomly intermixed within blocks: mean search 
RT was significantly longer (high load M =  833 ms; low load M =  655 ms) and 
error rate significantly higher (high load M — 19.6%; low load M =  5.6%) in the 
high perceptual load condition than the low perceptual load condition, F (l, 21) = 
141.56, M SE  =  2458.49, p  < .001, V  = .87 and F ( l ,  21) = 109.63, M SE  =  19.67, p  
< .001, rjp2 = .84 for RT and error rate, respectively.
C S D etection . Table 11 shows mean percentage detection and false alarm 
rates and mean d ’ and p for correct search trials only as a function of perceptual 
load.
Table 11. Mean (and SD) Percentage Detection and False Alarm Rates and Mean (and SD) d ’ and P
as a Function of Perceptual Load in Experiment 11.
Perceptual load Detection rate %
False alarm 
rate % d ’ P
Low 84.0 (15.7) 17.3 (20.5) 2.45 (1.05) 3.87 (7.55)
High 71.5 (26.3) 14.4 (19.8) 2.17 (1.20) 4.29 (5.73)
Detection rate and d ’ were again significantly lower in the high load than 
low load condition, F (l, 21) = 15.15, M SE  = 114.43, p  = .001, r|p2 = .42 and F (l,
21) = 4.68, M SE  = 0.18,/? = .042, r|p2 = .18 for the load effect on detection rate and 
d \  respectively. P was not significantly different between the low and high load 
conditions, F  <  1. Thus, Experiment 11 provides a successful replication of the 
effect of perceptual load on conscious detection using a design in which the level of 
load is randomly intermixed within each block and CS frequency is 17% of trials 
rather than 50% (as in Experiment 10).
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The E ffect o f  C S  F requency. The results of this experiment were compared 
with those of Experiment 10 (in which CS frequency was 50%) in a series of two 
way ANOVA with perceptual load and CS frequency as factors. As would be 
expected, there was a main effect of perceptual load on both detection rate, F (l, 42) 
= 17.41, M SE  = 130.29,p  <  .001, r|p2 = .29, and d \  F ( 1, 42) = 7.91, M SE  = 0.199p  
=  .007, rjp2 = .16. But there was no main effect of CS frequency for either, F (l, 42) 
= 1.20, M SE  =  5 5 6 3 1 ,p  = .279, r\p2 = .03 for detection rate, F <  1 for d \  Reducing 
the frequency of CS presentation produced a numerical trend in mean detection rate 
for a stronger effect of perceptual load (12.5% reduction rather than 7.7% reduction 
in Experiment 10); however, this was not significant, and neither was it for d \ F <
1 for both. There were no significant effects on p, F  <  1 for the main effect of 
perceptual load, F (l, 42) = 2.23, M SE  = 42.64, p  = .143, rjp2 = .05 for the main 
effect of CS frequency, and F  <  1 for the interaction.
4.4 Chapter Conclusions
Three experiments with a within-subjects design showed reduced conscious 
awareness when attention is focused on a task of high perceptual load compared to 
when it is focused on a task of low perceptual load. Irrespective of whether 
perceptual load conditions were blocked (Experiment 9), or were randomly 
intermixed within each block (Experiments 10 and 11), detection rate and detection 
sensitivity were both significantly lower in high load trials than low load trials. 
Furthermore, this effect was demonstrated with relatively high and low frequencies 
of CS presentation: 50% in Experiment 10, and 17% in Experiment 11.
The effect of perceptual load on detection, however, became weaker with 
the change from a between-subjects design to a within-subjects design,
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predominantly as a result of an increase in the rate of false alarms in the low 
perceptual load condition. The perceptual load effect became weaker still with the 
change from having the conditions of perceptual load in separate blocks to having 
load conditions randomly intermixed within each block. This may reflect the fact 
that there was a strategy component of the perceptual load effect in the experiments 
in Chapters 2 and 3.
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Chapter 5
Load Induced Blindness at Fixation
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We have seen in the preceding chapters that loading perception can prevent task- 
irrelevant stimuli from entering into conscious awareness. Such stimuli have, thus 
far, been presented exclusively in the peripheral field of view. An important 
question to ask is, could an object appearing directly at the point of fixation fail to 
enter awareness, or is conscious perception at fixation independent of perceptual 
load? Furthermore, is awareness of objects at fixation more likely than when they 
appear in peripheral vision, or equally likely?
In terms of resources, the visual system is hugely biased towards processing 
information that falls on the fovea (the point of fixation). It has been established 
that visual perception is superior at the fovea than in the periphery: acuity and 
contrast sensitivity are heightened due to the triplication of cone density (Devalois 
& Devalois, 1988; Fiorentini & Berardi, 1991), and although the area of the fovea 
covers only 1% of the retina, over 50% of the visual cortex is devoted to foveal 
vision and cells’ receptive fields are much smaller making resolution higher 
(Connolly & Van Essen, 1984; Daniel & Whitteridge, 1961; Hubei & Wiesel,
1974). In addition to this perceptual superiority, there is a multitude of evidence 
that attention is closely tied to the point of fixation. In spite of demonstrations that 
attention can be shifted away from fixation when the eye is stationary (Posner, 
1980; Posner, Nissen, & Ogden, 1978), research strongly suggests that attention 
and fixation are intimately linked, since the eyes tend to follow shifts of attention 
(Bryden, 1961; Crovitz & Davies, 1962) and, conversely, attention is typically 
reallocated in the direction of gaze (Chelazzi et al., 1996; Deubel & Schneider, 
1996; Hoffman & Subramaniam, 1995; Kowler, Anderson, Dosher, & Blaser,
1995; Shephard, Findlay, & Hockey, 1986). In addition, similar regions of
89
frontoparietal cortex are activated by saccades and shifts of spatial attention when 
the eye is stationary (Corbetta et al., 1998).
Several lines of research have addressed the effect of eccentricity on visual 
search, although only some of these have involved stimuli presented at the fovea. 
Carrasco, Evert, Chang, and Katz (1995) asked participants to perform a visual 
search task for a conjunction of features in a square grid containing up to 36 items. 
Target eccentricity varied between 0.7° and 3.5°. RTs and error rates increased 
monotonically with increasing eccentricity, even with very short exposure 
durations (104 and 62 ms), thus ruling out eye movements and multiple covert 
attentional shifts as confounds. A follow-up study (Carrasco & Frieder, 1997) 
suggested that this eccentricity effect was entirely due to the poorer visibility of 
peripheral targets, since the effect was eliminated when the sizes of the stimuli 
were scaled in accordance with the cortical magnification formula of Rovamo and 
Virsu (1979). Wolfe, O’Neil, and Bennett (1998), however, have contested this 
conclusion: they found that visibility differences made only a minor contribution to 
the eccentricity effect, since it persisted when items’ sizes were scaled. The 
discrepancy between these results may be explained by the fact that Carasco and 
Frieder’s (1997) search items in the non-scaled condition were much smaller than 
Wolfe et al.’s (1998) and so were less visible. The size-scaling in Carasco and 
Frieder’s (1997) experiment would therefore have aided visibility to a much greater 
extent than in Wolfe et al.’s (1998). Furthermore, Wolfe et al. (1998) demonstrated 
that the eccentricity effect was eliminated when the search set size was one (i.e., 
when targets were presented alone so no search was required) and when search 
items were presented in a ring centred at fixation and of variable radius (1.8° to 7°) 
so that all items were of equal eccentricity. These results strongly suggest that there
90
is more than visibility at work in the eccentricity effect, and indeed Wolfe et al. 
(1998) propose that attention is the culprit -  i.e., objects closer to fixation are 
prioritised in processing terms over those in the periphery.
Studies comparing the processing of stimuli at fixation and in the periphery 
involving the response competition paradigm have also produced conflicting data. 
Goolkasian (1981) used a Stroop paradigm to investigate the effects of distractors 
presented at fixation. The word of a colour, i.e., either ‘RED ’ or ‘GREEN’, was 
presented at fixation as a distractor, as well as a target colour patch in the 
periphery, at varied eccentricities. As with the visual search studies, display 
durations were brief to prevent eye movements (this was the case with all the 
response competition experiments I review next). The incongruent fixation 
distractor interfered with colour classification at all target locations except the most 
distant and the effect weakened as target eccentricity increased. A peripheral 
distractor condition was not included in this experiment, however, and therefore it 
was not possible to directly compare the effects of fixation distractors with 
peripheral distractors. Later, Goolkasian (1999) presented either a target at fixation 
with a peripheral distractor at varied eccentricity, or a distractor at fixation with the 
target in the periphery at varied eccentricity. Targets and distractors were either a 
capital letter ‘A’ or a capital ‘B’ and the presentation time was 50 ms, a short 
enough duration to ensure that no eye movements were possible. Distractor 
compatibility effects varied not only in association with the distractor’s distance 
from the target, but also with respect to the retinal location of the target and 
distractor stimuli. The processing of targets presented at fixation was slowed by the 
presence of an incompatible distractor at any location in the periphery, whereas 
targets in the periphery were only affected by a distractor at fixation if they were
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close together. Thus distance effects were obtained across a wider area of visual 
space when distractors were located in the periphery rather than at fixation. 
Furthermore, the compatibility effects of fixation distractors were smaller than 
those of peripheral distractors. Goolkasian suggested that this indicates that the 
processing of stimuli at fixation may be more effectively controlled and therefore, 
that stimuli at fixation can be more easily ignored than those presented in the 
periphery. However, Goolkasian’s methodology was confounded, since the 
peripheral targets in the fixation distractor condition would have been more 
difficult to identify than the targets at fixation in the peripheral distractor condition 
due to poorer visibility, and furthermore, peripheral targets could be presented in 
multiple locations whereas fixation targets were always presented at the same 
location, resulting in lesser location certainty for peripheral targets, a quality 
known to impair performance (Bashinski & Bacharach, 1980). Thus, the demand 
on attentional resources required by the task was not equivalent between fixation 
and peripheral distractor conditions, and therefore fixation distractors may have 
been rendered less effective than peripheral distractors by the greater load on 
attention in the fixation distractor condition.
Beck and Lavie (2005) succeeded in comparing the response compatibility 
effects of distractors at fixation with distractors in the periphery, while avoiding the 
confounds that Goolkasian’s experiments were subject to. They presented the task 
stimuli in a parafoveal circle so that the task was identical across fixation and 
peripheral distractor conditions in which only the location of the distractor was 
varied and the target-to-distractor distance always remained constant. Beck and 
Lavie obtained results in contrast to Goolkasian’s, such that the decrement to 
reaction time elicited by incongruent over congruent distractors was greater from
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those presented at fixation than those presented peripherally. These effects could 
not be attributed to the perceptual superiority of the fovea, as they persisted even 
when the sizes of the stimuli were scaled by the cortical magnification factor 
(Rovamo & Virsu, 1979). Neither could they be attributed to cueing by the fixation 
point, or the fact that fixation distractors were presented in the centre of the target 
letter-circle, while peripheral distractors were presented outside it, as these 
potential confounds were also cast aside by additional experiments. The authors 
contend that fixation distractors exerted greater compatibility effects than 
peripheral distractors due to a prioritisation of attention at fixation that affects the 
strength of competition for response selection between distractor and target stimuli. 
An additional important finding from this study was that increasing the perceptual 
load of the task reduced the effects of distractors at fixation to the same extent as it 
reduced the effects of distractors in the periphery. Such a result suggests that the 
processing of information at fixation, despite being a higher priority, is subject to 
the same capacity limits as the processing of information elsewhere in the visual 
field.
However, in all these studies the conclusions regarding irrelevant stimulus 
processing are based upon indirect measures of perception, such as the effects of 
distractors on target RTs. They can not support any direct conclusions about 
conscious perception since it can not be deduced whether a participant was 
conscious of the distractors or not on the basis of their RT to the target. While 
much of this research, therefore, provides convincing evidence that the processing 
of information at fixation is prioritised over the processing of information 
elsewhere in the visual field, it can tell us nothing about the participants’ conscious 
awareness of such information.
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Only one previous study has employed a direct measure of conscious 
perception. Mack and Rock (1998) compared levels of inattentional blindness for 
an unexpected object presented at fixation with the same object presented in the 
periphery. Twenty-five percent of participants viewing the peripheral unexpected 
object did not notice it, whereas as many as 85% of those viewing the same object 
at fixation failed to notice its presence. However, as with Goolkasian’s 
experiments, the attentional resources demanded by the task were not equivalent 
between conditions, as the target stimulus in the fixation unexpected object 
condition was presented peripherally, and in one of four locations, whereas the 
target stimulus in the peripheral unexpected object condition was always presented 
at fixation. The perceptual inferiority of peripheral vision, the additional strain on 
attention engendered by having to focus attention way from fixation, and the 
greater location uncertainty when the target stimulus was presented in the periphery 
would have resulted in a greater demand on attention than when the target stimulus 
was presented at fixation. These counter-intuitive results can therefore be explained 
in terms of fewer attentional resources being available to perceive the unexpected 
object when it was presented at fixation, since such resources would have been 
drawn by the higher load on attention required to perform the task when the target 
stimulus was presented in the periphery.
The experiments in this chapter compare awareness of a CS presented at 
fixation with awareness of a CS presented in one peripheral location under different 
levels of perceptual load (except Experiment 14 that had only a high perceptual 
load condition). Perceptual load was manipulated by increasing the search set size 
from one to six as with the previous chapters, and the CS was presented either at 
fixation, in which case it was smaller, or in the periphery. It was predicted that
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conscious awareness of the CS would be greater at fixation, but should still be 
reduced by high perceptual load.
5.1 Experiment 12
Experiment 12 examined whether the perceptual load of the search task would 
determine detection even when the CS was presented directly where participants 
were looking, i.e., at the point of fixation. As a comparison, the CS was also 
presented in one location outside of the circle of letters, either on the left or the 
right side. The peripheral CS was the same size as in previous experiments, but the 
fixation CS was made smaller than the peripheral CS in accordance with the 
cortical magnification formula of Rovamo and Virsu (1979) to compensate for the 
poorer contrast sensitivity of peripheral vision and the smaller area of cortex 
activated by peripheral stimuli.
5.1.1 Method
P articipan ts. Twenty new participants were recruited from UCL and were 
paid for their participation. One participant was replaced because she detected less 
than 75% of the CS in the control block, and two because their accuracy at the 
letter search task was below 65%. The age range of those included was 19 to 32 
years (M =  21.3 years, SD  = 2.8 years) and there were eight men.
Stim uli a n d  P rocedure. The apparatus, stimuli, and procedure were 
identical to Experiment 2 except that the CS was presented in only one of two 
locations, one at fixation (the centre of the screen) and the other on one side, either 
on the left or on the right of the circle of letters on the horizontal midline, 5.4° of 
visual angle from the fixation point. The CS was presented in 50% of trials and half
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of them were at fixation, with the other half in the periphery. Note that due to the 
change from six possible CS locations (as in all previous experiments except 
Experiment 8) to two possible CS locations (as in Experiment 8), the location 
certainty of the CS increased from 17% in each location to 50% in each location. 
The fixation CS (at 0° eccentricity) subtended 0.11° by 0.11° and the peripheral 
CS, presented at 5.4° eccentricity, subtended 0.3° by 0.3° was thus 2.76 times 
larger than the fixation CS in accordance with the cortical magnification formula of 
Rovamo and Virsu (1979). The letter circle was made slightly larger (1.8° radius) 
to make the distance between the nearest target letters and the CS the same whether 
the CS was presented at fixation or in the periphery. As with Experiments 6-11, the 
question mark signifying that the detection response could be made was presented 
for 2 s with no blank following it. A counterbalanced set of 144 different stimulus 
displays consisted of each of the target letters (two) in each of the letter circle 
positions (six), as well as the CS in each position (two).
5.1.2 Results and Discussion
L etter  Search  Task. Perceptual load was successfully increased with the 
manipulation of search set size in Experiment 12: mean search RT was 
significantly longer in the high perceptual load condition ( M =  847 ms) than the 
low perceptual load condition (M =  702 ms), F (l, 18) = 5.19, M SE  = 20,182.47,/?
= .035, r|p2 = .22, and error rate in the high perceptual load condition (M = 20.0%) 
was significantly higher than in the low perceptual load condition ( M =  8.7%), F (l, 
18) = 12.85, M SE  =  49.67,/? = .002, rjp2 = .42.
C S  D etection . Mean percentage detection rate as a function of perceptual 
load and CS location, and mean percentage false alarm rate and mean d ’ and p as a
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function of perceptual load are presented in Table 12 (correct search trials only). 
Since false alarm responses could not be assigned to CS location conditions, in all 
the experiments in this chapter false alarm rate, d ’, and P are not given by CS 
location.
Table 12. Mean (and SD) Percentage Detection Rate as a Function of Perceptual Load and CS 
Location and Mean (and SD) Percentage False Alarm Rate and Mean (and SD) d ’ and p as a 
Function of Perceptual Load in Experiment 12.
CS location
Fixation Periphery
Perceptual load Detection rate % FA rate% d ’ P
Low 80.2 (29.2) 98.0 (4.3) 5.0 (8.0) 3.37 (1.07) 3.42 (2.69)
High 46.0 (34.7) 74.1 (38.1) 3.4 (3.2) 2.27 (1.24) 7.28 (9.07)
In a three way ANOVA on detection rate with load, CS location, and side 
as factors and a two way ANOVA on d ’ with load and side as factors, there were 
main effects of perceptual load, as expected: detection rate and d ’ were 
significantly lower under high perceptual load than low, F (l, 16) = 7.61, M S E  =  
1094.01 , p  =  .014, r|p2 = .32 and F ( 1,16) = 4.71, M S E =  1.29, p  = .045, r|P2 = .23 
for detection rate and d ’, respectively. In a further two way ANOVA on p with load 
and side as factors, there was no main effect of perceptual load, as with previous 
experiments, F (l, 16) = 1.76, M SE =  42.39,/? = .204 , rjp2 = .10. The main effect of 
CS location on detection rate was also significant, but contrary to expectations 
mean detection rate was lower at fixation than in the periphery, F ( 1, 16) = 6.55, 
M SE  = 644.49,/? = .021, rjp2 = .29. There was no interaction of load and location, F  
< 1. A paired comparison revealed that the detection rate for CS presented at
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fixation was significantly reduced by high perceptual load, t ( l  8) = 2.39, S E M =  
14.37, p  =  .028, and that the detection rate for CS presented in the periphery 
followed the same trend, but fell short of achieving significance, /(18) = 1.97, S E M  
= 12.11,/? = .064. These results support the previous finding that load modulates 
the interference effect of distractors at fixation as well as those in the periphery 
(Beck & Lavie, 2005).
Whether the peripheral CS was presented on the left or the right had no 
effect on detection rate, d \  or p: F (l, 16) = 1.94, M SE  = 1094.01 ,/? = .183, r|p2 = 
.11; F ( \ ,  16) = 2.29, M S E =  1.29,/? = .150, T|p2 = .13; F <  1; there was no 
interaction of side with load: F( 1, 16) = 1.53, M SE  =  1094.01,/? = .234, r|p2 = .09 
for detection rate; F  < 1 for d ’; F (l, 16) = 2.83, M SE  = 42.39,/? = .112, r|p2 = .15 
for p; in the three way ANOVA on detection rate there was no interaction of side 
with CS location or side with load and CS location, both F <  1.
Fixation CS were harder to detect for two reasons -  they were very small 
(Goolkasian [1994,1999] has shown previously that size scaling can only correct 
for cortical magnification when fixation stimuli subtend at least 0.7° - here they 
subtended 0.1°) and they may have been masked by the after-image of the question 
mark presented at fixation to indicate when the CS detection response should be 
made. These issues were addressed in the next experiment.
5.2 Experiment 13
In order to provide a better test of whether stimuli at fixation are more likely to 
enter conscious awareness than stimuli in the periphery, in Experiment 13 the 
fixation CS was increased in size to 0.7° in accordance with the findings of 
Goolkasian (1994, 1999). The size of the peripheral CS therefore became 1.9°.
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Furthermore, the question mark used to indicate the time to make the CS detection 
response was replaced with a low-pitched tone in order to prevent the afterimage of 
the centrally located question mark masking the fixation CS on the following trial.
5.2.1 Method
P artic ipan ts. Fifteen new participants were recruited from UCL and were 
paid for their participation. Three participants were replaced because their accuracy 
at the letter search task was below 65%. The age range was 18 to 30 years ( M =
22.5 years, S D  = 3.5 years) and there were five men. All of the participants had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were nai've to the purposes of the 
experiment.
Stim uli a n d  P rocedure. The apparatus, stimuli and procedure were the same 
as Experiment 12 except that the participants were now instructed to press the 4 A’ 
key when the CS was absent rather than make no response. The fixation CS (at 0° 
eccentricity) was increased in size to 0.7° by 0.7° (from Goolkasian, 1994, 1999), 
which meant that the peripheral CS (remaining at 5.4° eccentricity as in 
Experiment 12) was now 1.9° by 1.9° (2.76 times larger in accordance with the 
cortical magnification formula of Rovamo & Virsu, 1979). Due to the large 
increase in size of the peripheral CS, the letter circle had to be made slightly 
smaller (1.7° radius) to equate the distance between both CS locations and the 
nearest target letters. Finally, the question mark presented for 2 s to indicate when 
participants should make their detection response was replaced with a 2 s low- 
pitched tone.
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5.2.2 Results and Discussion
L etter Search. Perceptual load was again successfully increased with the 
manipulation of search set size in Experiment 13: mean search RT was 
significantly longer and error rate significantly higher in the high perceptual load 
condition ( M RT = 1039 ms and M error rate = 21.3%) than the low (MRT = 682 
ms and M  error rate = 6.0%), F (1, 13) = 44.54, M SE  = 10,309.71,/? < .001, rjp2 = 
.77 for RT, and F (l, 13) = 18.97, M SE  = 44.62, p  =  .001, t)p2 = .59 for error rate.
C S D etection . Mean percentage detection rate as a function of perceptual 
load and CS location, and mean percentage false alarm rate and mean d ’ and p as a 
function of perceptual load are presented in Table 13 (correct search trials only).
Table 13. Mean (and SD) Percentage Detection Rate as a Function of Perceptual Load and CS 
Location and Mean (and SD) Percentage False Alarm Rate and Mean (and SD) d ’ and P as a 
Function of Perceptual Load in Experiment 13.
CS location
Fixation Periphery
Perceptual load Detection rate % FA rate% d ’ P
Low 98.6 (3.4) 90.3 (13.4) 3.7 (2.4) 3.55 (0.34) 4.41 (8.53)
High 88.6 (17.4) 90.8 (17.0) 3.9 (4.6) 3.38 (0.99) 2.21 (0.85)
As the table suggests, detection rate was not significantly lower under high 
perceptual load than low, F  <  1. d ’ across locations was also not significantly lower 
in the high load condition, and neither was P, both F  < 1. There was also no effect 
of CS location on detection rate, F ( 1,11) = 1.01, M SE  = 65.82,/? = .337, rjp2 = .08. 
Clearly the larger sized CS were much easier to detect, unfortunately resulting in a 
ceiling effect in this experiment, but nevertheless there was a numerical trend
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towards an interaction between load and CS location, F ( 1, 11) = 3.05, M SE  =
65.82, p  = .109, r|p2 = .22, such that under low perceptual load, there was a trend for 
more fixation CS being detected (M =  98.6%) than peripheral CS (M =  90.3%), t(5) 
= 1.94, S E M =  4.30, p  = . 111, but there was very little difference ( M =  2.2%) 
between fixation and peripheral CS under high perceptual load, t  <  1. In addition, 
there was a non-significant numerical trend for fewer fixation CS being detected 
under high (M =  88.6%) than low (M =  98.6%) perceptual load, ^(13) = 1.37, S E M  
= 7.30, p  = .195, but there was no difference for peripheral CS ( M =  90.8% vs. 
90.3%), t <  1. Whether the peripheral CS was presented on the left or the right had 
no effect on detection rate, and did not interact with load or location or both, all F  <  
1.
5.3 Experiment 14
In Experiment 13, CS detection performance was near to ceiling, so in Experiment 
14 the CS was made fainter in order to reduce the contrast between the CS and the 
background so that detection would be more difficult, thus preventing a ceiling 
effect. Only the high perceptual load condition was run to ensure that detection 
performance was off the ceiling. Detection rate was predicted to be higher for 
fixation CS than peripheral CS.
5.3.1 Method
P artic ipan ts. Eight new participants were recruited from UCL and were 
paid for their participation. Eight participants were replaced because they detected 
less than 75% of the CS in the control block, and six because their accuracy at the
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letter search task was below 65%. The age range of those included was 21 to 29 
years (M =  25.3 years, SD  = 3.0 years) and there were two men.
Stim uli a n d  P rocedure. The apparatus, stimuli and procedure were the same 
as Experiment 13 except that the letter search task was always of high perceptual 
load, the CS was presented in 50% of trials rather than 17% (as per Experiment 7), 
and the CS was a lighter shade of grey (RGB values: 197, 197, 197).
5.3.2 Results and Discussion
L etter  Search. Mean search RT was 767 ms and mean error rate was 15.0%, 
both of which are comparable to high perceptual load search task performance in 
previous experiments.
C S D etection . Mean percentage detection rate as a function of CS location, 
and mean percentage false alarm rate and mean d ’ and P are presented in Table 14 
(correct search trials only).
Table 14. Mean (and SD) Percentage Detection Rate as a Function of CS Location and Mean (and 
SD) Percentage False Alarm Rate and Mean (and SD) d ’ and P in Experiment 14.
CS location
Fixation Periphery
Perceptual load Detection rate % FA rate
%
d ’ p
High 90.5 (9.4) 53.4 (26.5) 10.5 (6.3) 1.93 (0.70) 1.90 (0.40)
As can be seen in the table, detection rate was significantly higher when the
CS was presented at fixation compared to when it was presented in the periphery,
F (l, 6) = 15.76, M SE  = 349.59,/? = .007, r|p2 = .72, and whether the peripheral CS
was presented on the left or the right had no effect on detection rate, F (l, 6) = 2.24,
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M SE =  345.87,/? = .185, rjp2 = .27, and there was no interaction between these two 
factors, F (l, 6) = 1.63, M SE  = 349.59,/? = .249, rjp2 = .21. These data provide 
support for the notion that a greater attentional weight at fixation leads to stimuli 
being more likely to enter into awareness than stimuli appearing elsewhere in the 
visual field.
5.4 Chapter Conclusions
The results of Experiment 12 demonstrated that the effect of perceptual load on 
conscious awareness can be generalised to stimuli located at fixation. Furthermore, 
Experiment 14 showed that stimuli at fixation are more likely to enter awareness 
than stimuli appearing in peripheral vision, despite being size-scaled to equate 
visibility. These results compliment previous research that employed indirect 
measures of perception, showing that distractor interference effects are modulated 
by perceptual load but that interference from fixation distractors is greater than 
from peripheral distractors (Beck & Lavie, 2005). Taken together, these findings 
support the notion that stimuli falling upon the fovea are prioritised for processing. 
In other words, there is a greater weight of attention at the fovea that renders any 
information located there more capable of causing interference and more likely to 
enter conscious awareness.
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Chapter 6
The Role of Working Memory Load
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An important dissociation in load theory is between the effects of perceptual load 
and working memory load on selective attention (Lavie, 2000; Lavie, Hirst, De 
Fockert, & Viding, 2004). Whereas high perceptual load reduces distractor 
processing, high working memory load increases distractor processing. This 
dissociation is important as it highlights two different means of attentional control. 
The effects of perceptual load indicate a rather passive means of attentional 
selection, whereby the irrelevant distractors are simply not perceived when 
perceptual capacity is exhausted by task-relevant processing under high perceptual 
load. The effects of working memory load indicate a more active executive control 
role: working memory actively maintains stimulus processing priorities in a task, 
so when working memory is loaded with task-unrelated material, processing of 
distractors in the selective attention task is increased. Evidence for this dissociation 
has come from studies demonstrating that in contrast with the reduction in 
distractor effects found with tasks of high perceptual load, high working memory 
load increases distractor effects, on both RTs (in the response competition and 
attentional capture paradigms, e.g., Lavie, 2000; Lavie & De Fockert, 2005; Lavie 
et al., 2004) and neural activity (related to irrelevant distractor faces in a Stroop- 
like paradigm, De Fockert, Rees, Frith, & Lavie, 2001). I review these studies 
below.
Lavie et al. (2004) asked participants to perform a low perceptual load 
search task with a congruent or incongruent distractor presented on each trial (low 
perceptual load so that the distractors would be processed), while manipulating the 
availability of cognitive control processes by varying the load on working memory. 
This was achieved by requiring that participants remember either a single digit (low 
working memory load) or a set of six digits (high working memory load), while
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performing the search task. Participants’ memory for the set of digits was tested by 
asking whether a probe digit (presented after the search task had been completed on 
each trial) had been a member of the memory set or not. Lavie et al. (2004) 
intended that by loading working memory, the availability of cognitive control 
processes required to differentiate between competing relevant and irrelevant 
stimuli would be reduced, resulting in an increase in the frequency of intrusions 
from irrelevant stimuli. This is exactly what was found: in the high working 
memory load condition, incongruent distractors produced a larger RT decrement 
and a larger increase in error rates compared to congruent distractors, than in the 
low working memory load condition. This finding supports the theory that the 
availability of cognitive control processes, and specifically, working memory, 
determines the efficiency of selective attention.
The effect of working memory load is precisely the opposite to that of 
perceptual load (Lavie, 1995), i.e., under high perceptual load distractor effects are 
decreased, whereas under high working memory load, distractor effects increase. 
These two effects were demonstrated in the same experiment by Lavie et al.
(2004), in which both perceptual load and working memory load were 
manipulated: under low perceptual load, there were large distractor effects on RTs 
in both conditions of working memory load, but they were larger under high 
working memory load than low (111 ms vs. 72 ms). Under high perceptual load, 
these distractor effects all but disappeared, but were still larger under high working 
memory load (35 ms vs. -8 ms under low working memory load). Thus, the 
increase in interference caused by loading working memory can be seen to occur 
even under conditions of high perceptual load, and likewise, high perceptual load 
still drastically diminishes the processing of task-irrelevant information even when
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the ability of cognitive control to maintain the focus of selective attention on task 
priorities is impaired. The stark contrast between the opposing outcomes of loading 
the perceptual and working memory systems gives weight to Lavie and colleagues’ 
hypothesis that there exist two dissociable mechanisms by which selective attention 
can resist distraction: a passive form of control in which interference is eliminated 
when there is insufficient capacity remaining to process any information other than 
that specific to the task at hand, and an active form that engages working memory 
in maintaining current task processing priorities, thereby suppressing the 
processing of information not related to the task.
Loading working memory is not the only way to diminish the availability of 
cognitive control processes that would otherwise strive to prevent distraction. 
Indeed, a greater demand on such processes also occurs during multi-tasking (e.g., 
Della Sala, Baddeley, Papagano, & Spinnler, 1995; D’Esposito et al., 1995; Miller 
& Cohen, 2001; Shallice & Burgess, 1996). Lavie et al. (2004) demonstrated that 
exactly the same effect as that produced by loading working memory is achieved 
when executive control is required to coordinate two tasks simultaneously. 
Distractor interference effects exerted during the performance of a single, low 
perceptual load search task were compared with those produced while participants 
undertook the same search task immediately following the completion of a working 
memory task (the same stimuli and individual task procedures as those used in the 
aforementioned experiments by Lavie et al. (2004) were employed -  the only 
difference being that the working memory task probe was presented and responded 
to before the search task display was presented). Two such experiments were run, 
one in which the working memory task was of low load, and another in which it 
was of high load. The results were the same regardless of the level of working
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memory load: distractor effects on RTs were increased by approximately 30 ms in 
both cases, a comparable increase to those produced by the change from low 
working memory load to high in Lavie et al.’s (2004) other experiments. Overall 
distractor effects were somewhat smaller in these single vs. dual-task experiments 
(approx. 60 ms) than in the low vs. high working memory load experiments 
(between 100 and 200 ms), as would be expected, since the low vs. high working 
memory load experiments were all also dual-task situations, so the demand on 
cognitive control was compounded by the combination of working memory load 
and dual-task coordination.
The support for Lavie and colleagues’ cognitive control hypothesis has 
been broadened recently by the finding that the effects of attentional capture by 
singletons are increased under conditions of high working memory load, just as are 
the effects of response competitive distractors. Lavie and De Fockert (2005) 
reported that two different manipulations of working memory load each produced 
an approximately 40 ms increase in RT decrement in the presence of a singular 
green circle among a set of red circles compared with when there were only red 
circles, while a line orientation task was performed in which each line was 
contained within one coloured circle. The increased distraction that occurs when 
cognitive control processes are rendered less effective in preventing intrusions is 
therefore not limited to response-related distractors, but also occurs in the presence 
of perceptually salient singletons.
Lastly, the effects of working memory load on the processing of irrelevant 
information have been replicated in a neuroimaging study involving the response 
competitive distractor effects of pictures of faces (De Fockert et al., 2001). A 
working memory task involving the maintenance of the order of a sequence of
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digits (the numbers one to four in a random order in the high working memory load 
condition; in numerical order in the low working memory load condition) was 
interleaved with a name categorisation task, in which famous politicians’ and pop 
stars’ names had to be identified as such while congruent or incongruent pictures of 
the faces of the same celebrities were presented. Not only were face distractor 
interference effects greater in high working memory load than low, for both RTs 
(78 ms vs. 46 ms; note an increase of approximately 30 ms as per the 
aforementioned experiments) and error rates, but neural activity in the fusiform 
gyrus and other areas of extrastriate cortex known to be associated with the 
processing of faces (e.g., Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997) occurring when 
the distractor faces were presented, was greater under conditions of high working 
memory load than low. Taken together, the behavioural and neuroimaging findings 
reported by De Fockert et al. (2001) provide highly convincing evidence in support 
of the hypothesis that extraneous information is not so easily dismissed when 
processes of cognitive control are less readily available to maintain current task 
priorities due to the loading of working memory.
As with the vast majority of the research on perceptual load, however, the 
evidence that working memory load increases distractor processing is thus far 
limited to indirect measures that can not lead to any definitive conclusions 
regarding conscious perception. The next experiments therefore sought to examine 
the effects of working memory load on detection. Experiment 15 compared 
detection sensitivity of the CS while performing a low perceptual load search task 
under conditions of high and low working memory load. Experiment 16 
manipulated perceptual load, in addition to working memory load, while assessing
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the effects of those manipulations and their interaction, on CS detection sensitivity 
in some blocks of trials, and on response competitive distractors in others.
6.1 Experiment 15
In Experiment 15, the visual search and CS detection task were interleaved with a 
working memory task. A memory set of either one digit (in the low working 
memory load condition) or six digits (in the high working memory load condition) 
was presented at the start of each trial followed by the search and detection tasks. 
Participants had to retain the digit(s) in working memory while performing the 
search and detection tasks in order to judge whether a probe digit presented at the 
end of the trial had been a member of the memory set. The search task was always 
of low perceptual load and was identical to that used in the previous experiments.
6.1.1 Method
P articipan ts. Twelve new participants were recruited from UCL and were 
paid for their participation. One participant was replaced because he detected less 
than 75% of the CS in the control block, and another because his false alarm rate 
was 100% in the experimental blocks. The age range of those included was 20 to 
32 years (M =  25.5 years, SD  = 4.1 years) and there were four men.
Stim uli a n d  P rocedure. A schematic of the procedure of Experiment 15 is 
shown in Figure 10. The stimuli and procedure for the visual search and CS 
detection task were the same as those used in the low perceptual load condition of 
Experiment 7. The stimuli for the working memory task (as per Lavie, 2000; Lavie 
et al., 2004) consisted of a memory set of either a single digit (low working 
memory load) or six digits (high working memory load). The digits for each
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memory set were selected at random from 0 to 9, and each digit was equally likely 
to be present in the memory set of each load condition. The order of the six digits 
in the memory set of the high working memory load condition was random, with 
the constraint that no more than two digits were presented in sequential order. The 
digits were black, subtended 0.7° by 0.5°, and were centred on the screen, in a row 
when there were six digits (high load condition). The memory probe digit had the 
same colour and dimensions as the memory set digits and was also centred on the 
screen. Whether a probe was or was not a member of the memory set was equally 
likely, and was counterbalanced with respect to CS presence and CS position. In 
the high working memory load condition the probe digit was equally likely to have 
been in any of the six digit positions in the memory set. At the beginning of each 
trial, a fixation dot was presented for 1 s followed by a 1 s presentation of the 
memory set display. A mask consisting of a 4° by 1.4° patch of random noise 
(black and grey) occupying the same position as the six digits was then presented 
for 500 ms followed by a blank screen (500 ms). The letter circle was then 
displayed (100 ms) followed by a mask (500 ms) and then the words ‘which 
letter?’ at the centre of the screen (1400 ms), during which time participants made 
their response to the search task. Next, the word ‘spot?’ (black letters subtending 
0.9° by 0.7°) was presented at the centre of the screen until the detection response 
was made (either present or absent, ‘S’ or ‘A’ key). The detection response was 
followed by the presentation of the memory probe at the centre of the screen, which 
remained on screen until participants made their memory task response.
Participants used their left hand to press the ‘S’ key if the probe was present in the 
memory set, or the ‘A’ key if it was absent. Incorrect memory task responses were 
followed by a beep (lower in pitch than the beep given as feedback for the search
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task). In the control block the participants were instructed to ignore the memory set 
and simply press ‘A’ in response to all memory probes. Each of the working 
memory load conditions was presented in a 72-trial block consisting of a 
counterbalanced set of stimulus displays, with equal likelihood of each of the target 
letters (two), in each of the letter circle positions (six), either without or with the 
CS in each position (six). Half of the participants performed the low load block 
first and the other half performed the high load block first. The control block used 
half of the trials from the low load block and half from the high load block.
528412
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Figure 10. A schematic of the procedure of Experiment 15.
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6.1.2 Results and Discussion
W orking M em ory Task. Longer mean RT and a greater number of errors in 
the high working memory load condition (MRT = 1296 ms; M  error rate = 14.6%) 
than in the low working memory load condition (MRT = 1028 ms; Merror rate = 
7.7%) confirmed that the manipulation of working memory load by memory set 
size was effective, F ( 1 ,11)=  17.93, M SE  = 24,116.41,/? = .001, rjp2 = .62 for RT; 
F (l, 11) = 8.24, M SE  = 33.99, p  = .015, rjp2 = .43 for error rate.
L etter  Search. Mean search RT and error rate were no different in the high 
working memory load condition (MRT = 848 ms; Merror rate = 3.4%) and the low 
working memory load condition (MRT = 842 ms; Merror rate = 4.9%), F  <  1 for 
RT and F ( 1, 11) = 1.17, M SE  =  11.59,/? = .304, rjp2 = .10 for error rate. This has 
often been the case in previous working memory load studies: working memory 
load in these studies typically has a selective effect on distractor processing with no 
general increase in overall RT and error rate in the main task (e.g., Lavie et al., 
2004).
C S D etection . Trials in which either the search response or the working 
memory response were incorrect were excluded from the analysis. Table 15 shows 
mean percentage detection and false alarm rates and mean d ’ and p as a function of 
working memory load.
Table 15. Mean (and SD) Percentage Detection and False Alarm Rates and Mean (and SD) d ’ and (3 
as a Function of Working Memory Load in Experiment 15.
Working memory 
load
Detection 
rate %
False alarm 
rate % d ’ P
Low 91.1 (20.8) 10.9 (12.4) 3.13 (1.25) 0.94 (0.82)
High 89.5 (25.3) 10.1 (16.2) 3.11 (1.43) 0.86 (0.40)
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As can be seen in the table, detection rate and d ’ were no different in the 
high and low working memory load conditions, F  < 1 for load effects on both 
detection rate and d ’. (3 was also not significantly different between memory load 
conditions, F  < 1.
Thus, in contrast with the consistent reduction in the detection rate and 
sensitivity of CS detection with high, compared to low, perceptual load in 
Experiments 1-11, Experiment 15 demonstrates that detection is unaffected by 
working memory load.
6.2 Experiment 16
In Experiment 16, the effect of working memory load on detection was compared 
with its effect on distractor interference effects. As I reviewed in the introduction to 
the chapter, previous research has shown that distractor effects (e.g., the difference 
in mean RT between congruent distractor trials and incongruent distractor trials) 
increase under high working memory load (e.g., Lavie et al., 2004). To enable this 
comparison, a distractor letter that was either congruent or incongruent with the 
search task response was presented with the search task in half of the blocks 
(response competition blocks) with high or low working memory load, and the 
other half were detection blocks with high or low working memory load (as in 
Experiment 15).
In Experiment 15, detection performance had been near ceiling (90.3% 
mean detection rate and mean d ’ of 3.12), so there had not been a great deal of 
scope for working memory load to increase detection rate or detection sensitivity. 
To resolve this, a high perceptual load search task condition was included in 
Experiment 16 in order to produce a lower baseline level of detection sensitivity
114
and hence provide more conducive conditions for an increase with high working 
memory load to occur. Experiment 16, therefore, involved manipulations of both 
perceptual load and working memory load, while separately measuring the effects 
on both distractor interference effects and detection sensitivity.
6.2.1 Method
P articipan ts. Seventeen new participants were recruited from UCL and 
were paid for their participation. Four participants were replaced because they 
detected less than 75% of the CS in the control block, and 4 because their accuracy 
at the letter search task was below 65%. The age range of those included was 19 to 
31 years (M =  23.6 years, S D  =  3.5 years) and there were seven men.
Stimuli. The letter search task was changed for this experiment to match 
that used previously in experiments which demonstrated an increase in distractor 
effects under high working memory load (De Fockert et al., 2001; Lavie, 2000; 
Lavie & De Fockert, 2005; Lavie et al., 2004). The target letter, a capital letter X or 
N (0.65° by 0.5°), each equally likely, appeared at random but with equal 
probability at one of six letter locations in a horizontal line that was centred at 
fixation. In the low perceptual load condition the remaining five locations were 
unoccupied whereas in the high perceptual load condition they were occupied by 
five non-target capital letters (H, K, M, W and Z) of the same size as the target 
letter and presented equally spaced (nearest contours 0.4° apart). In the response 
competition blocks, a slightly larger (0.7° by 0.55°), congruent or incongruent 
distractor letter (i.e., also a capital letter X or N), was presented either above or 
below the middle of the line of possible target letter locations, centred at 1.5° above 
the centre of the screen, on the vertical midline. In the detection blocks, the CS, the
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same meaningless grey shape (0.3° by 0.3°) used in all the previous experiments 
was also presented either above or below the middle of the line of letters, centred at 
3.5° above the centre of the screen, on the vertical midline. This distance was used 
in order to preserve the distance between the search task letters and the CS that was 
used in all of the previous experiments. The frequency of CS presentation was 
50%, with half above the line of letters and half below. Note that due to the change 
from six possible CS locations (as in Experiments 1-7, 9-11, and 15) to two 
possible CS locations (as in Experiments 8, and 12-14), the location certainty of the 
CS increased from 17% in each location to 50% in each location. The background 
of the display was black (RGB values: 0, 0, 0), the CS was a dark grey (RGB 
values: 25, 25, 25), and the letters (including the distractors) were grey (RGB 
values: 125, 125, 125). For a mask, a black mesh pattern covered the whole screen 
except for a square (6° by 6°) in the centre so as not to mask the target letters.
The successor naming memory task (De Fockert et al., 2001; Lavie & De 
Fockert, 2005; Sternberg, 1967) was employed in this experiment since this task is 
known to be particularly demanding on working memory and therefore may be 
more likely to have an effect on CS detection. The stimuli consisted of a set of 5 
digits (always containing 0, 1, 2, 3 and 4) of which the order was varied between 
low and high working memory load conditions: they were presented in numerical 
order in the low working memory load condition and in a random order, but always 
beginning with 0, in the high working memory load condition. They were grey 
(RGB values: 125,125, 125), subtended 0.7° by 0.55° each, and were centred on 
the screen, in a row. The memory probe was selected at random from the set of 5 
digits (0, 1, 2, 3 or 4), although it was never 4 in the low working memory load 
condition because no digit ever followed 4 in that condition (4 is the last digit in
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the sequence when they are arranged in numerical order). The memory probe was 
equally likely to have been in any position in the sequence given at the start of the 
trial except last (since no digit followed the last one), and it had the same colour 
and dimensions as the memory set digits, and was centred on the screen with a 
question mark after it.
P rocedure. Schematics of the procedures in the detection and response 
competition blocks of Experiment 16 are shown in Figures 11 and 12, respectively. 
At the beginning of each trial, a fixation dot was presented for 500 ms followed by 
a 1500 ms presentation of the memory set for the high working memory load 
condition or a 750 ms presentation for the low load condition. For a mask, five 
hash symbols (#) occupying the same position as the five digits were then 
presented for 1000 ms followed by the fixation dot again for 500 ms. The target 
and distractor letters were then displayed (100 ms) followed by a mask (500 ms) 
and then a blank screen (1400 ms), during which time participants made their 
response to the search task. Next, but only during the detection blocks, the word 
‘spot?’ (grey letters [RGB values: 125, 125, 125] subtending 0.9° by 0.7°) was 
presented for 3 s, during which the detection response was made, either present or 
absent (‘S’ or ‘A’ key). The detection response was followed by the presentation of 
the memory probe, which remained on screen for 4 s or until the participant pressed 
the ‘O’, ‘ 1 ’, ‘2’, ‘3’ or ‘4’ key on the numeric keypad to indicate which number had 
followed the probe in the memory set. Incorrect search task and working memory 
task responses (including making no response) were followed by a beep (with a 
lower pitch beep for incorrect memory task responses).
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Figure 11. A schematic of the procedure in the detection blocks of Experiment 16.
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Figure 12. A schematic of the procedure in the response competition blocks of Experiment 16.
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The stimuli were presented in eight blocks of 72 trials. In four of the blocks 
(the detection blocks) the participants had to perform the letter search task without 
distractor letters presented, the CS detection task (with the CS presented in 36 
randomly selected trials per block, i.e., 50%) and the working memory task (either 
low or high working memory load). In the other four blocks (the response 
competition blocks) the participants had to perform the letter search task with 
distractor letters presented and the working memory task (either low or high 
working memory load). The CS was never presented in the response competition 
blocks and the participants were not asked to look out for it. Additionally, the mask 
following the CS was replaced with a blank screen. Perceptual load was 
manipulated between-subjects so that for each participant the blocks were all either 
low or high perceptual load and were ordered in one of four possible arrangements 
in which the working memory load of the blocks was either ordered ABB AABB A 
or BAABBAAB and the task type of each block (i.e., whether it was a response 
competition block or a detection block) was ordered ABABABAB or 
BABABABA. The four possible arrangements were therefore as follows (where L 
= low working memory load, H = high working memory load, R = Response 
Competition block, and C = CS Detection block): LR HC HR LC HR LC LR HC, 
HR LC LR HC LR HC HR LC, LC HR HC LR HC LR LC HR or HC LR LC HR 
LC HR HC LR.
In the detection blocks the combinations of target letter position and CS 
position were counterbalanced so that for each target letter position the CS was 
presented three times above and three times below the line of letters and it was not 
presented six times. In the response competition blocks the combinations of target 
letter position and distractor letter position were counterbalanced so that for each
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target letter position the distractor letter was presented six times above the line of 
letters (three times congruent and three times incongruent) and six times below it 
(again, three times congruent and three times incongruent).
One low and one high working memory load practice block of 36 trials was 
undertaken before embarking on the eight experiment blocks followed by the 
control block, which contained half low working memory load trials and half high 
working memory load trials (making 72 trials). Participants were instructed to 
ignore the numbers and letters in the control block and to just report the presence or 
absence of the CS.
6.2.2 Results and Discussion
W orking M em ory T ask  One way ANOVA on memory task mean RT 
(incorrect trials excluded) and error rate as a function of working memory load 
(low and high) across block types and perceptual load conditions revealed a main 
effect of working memory load. There was a longer mean RT and a greater number 
of errors on the memory task in the high working memory load condition (MRT = 
1225 ms; M  error rate = 12.4%) than in the low working memory load condition (M 
RT = 816 ms; M  error rate = 1.8%), which confirmed that the manipulation of 
working memory load was effective, F (1, 16) = 135.79, M S E  =  10,452.80, p <
.001, lip2 = .90 for RT, F (l, 16) = 18.99, M SE  = 50.19, p  <  .001, r)p2 = .54 for error 
rate.
L etter Search. Incorrect search task trials and memory task trials were 
excluded from the RT analysis, as well as RTs over 1.5 s. A mixed model ANOVA 
with perceptual load as a between-subjects factor and working memory load as a 
within-subjects factor on mean search RT across block types was performed. There
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was a non-significant trend for a main effect of working memory load on mean 
search RT (M =  23 ms longer with high working memory load), F ( 1, 15) = 4.15, 
M SE  = 1131.14, p  = .060, rjp2 = .22. Surprisingly, although there was a clear 
numerical trend for a longer mean RT in the high perceptual load condition (M =
831 ms) than low perceptual load condition (M =  737 ms), the main effect of 
perceptual load was not significant, F (l, 15) = 1.00, M SE  =  74,741.41, p  = .333, r|p2 
= .06. This appears to be due to two particularly slow participants in the low 
perceptual load condition (both with a mean search RT of over 900 ms). There was 
no interaction between working memory load and perceptual load, F <  1.
A similar mixed model ANOVA on search task error rate revealed no effect 
of working memory load (high working memory load M =  10.2%; low load M  =  
11.6%), F (l, 15) = 3.04, M S E =  5.33,p  =  .102, rjp2 = .17, but a significant main 
effect of perceptual load: errors were more frequent in the high perceptual load 
condition (M =  13.8%) than the low perceptual load condition ( M =  7.9%), F (l, 15) 
= 5.18, M SE  = 56.29,p  = .038, rjp2 = .26. There was no interaction, F <  1.
D istra c to r  C ongruency E ffects in the R espon se C o m p etitio n  B locks. Trials 
in which either the search response or the working memory response were incorrect 
were excluded from the analysis, as well as RTs over 1.5 s. Mean search RT and 
error rate as a function of perceptual load, working memory load, and distractor 
congruency are presented in Table 16. To analyse the distractor congruency effects 
in the response competition blocks, a three way mixed model ANOVA on mean 
search RT with perceptual load as a between-subjects factor and working memory 
load and distractor congruency as within-subjects factors was performed. As with 
the ANOVA across blocks, there was no main effect of perceptual load, F <  1, 
although the main effect of working memory load did reach significance, F (l, 15)
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= 4.70, M SE  = 2631.09, p  = .047, r)p2 = .24, and there was no interaction of 
perceptual load with working memory load, F ( 1, 15)= 1.36, M SE  = 2631.09, p  =
.262, Tip2 = .08.
Table 16. Mean (and SD) Search RT and Error Rate as a Function of Perceptual Load, Working 
Memory Load and Distactor Congruency in Experiment 16.
Working memory load
Low High
Distractor
congruency
I C I - C I c I - C
Perceptual load
Low
RT ms 738(212) 682 (180) 56 (39) 804 (207) 700(161) 104 (66)
Errors % 11.9(8.1) 9.3 (8.0) 2.6 (4.4) 12.1 (6.9) 5.8 (3.5) 6.3 (6.6)
High
RT ms 816(166) 798(151) 18(32) 822 (196) 817 (175) 5 (56)
Errors % 14.2 (5.0) 10.9 (4.9) 3.4 (6.4) 14.0(9.9) 12.4 (5.8) 1.6 (5.3)
As would be expected, there was a significant main effect of distractor 
congruency, such that mean RT was longer when incongruent distractors were 
presented (M = 795 ms) compared to when congruent distractors were presented 
(M= 749 ms), F (l, 15) = 19.30, M S E =  1839.55,/? = .001, pp2 = .56. Furthermore, 
as expected, there was a significant interaction between perceptual load and 
distractor congruency, F ( 1, 15) = 10.91, M SE  = 1839.55,/? = .005, rjp2 = .42, such 
that the response competition distractor effect was greater under low perceptual 
load (MRT difference between congruent and incongruent distractor conditions =
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80 ms) than high perceptual load (MRT difference =12 ms). There was no 
working memory load by congruency interaction, F ( 1, 15) = 1.83, M SE  = 704.21 ,/? 
= .196, r|p2 = .11, but there was a significant three way interaction between working 
memory load, perceptual load and distractor congruency, F ( 1, 15) = 5.75, M SE  = 
704.21 ,/? = .030, rjp2 = .28, such that in the low perceptual load condition the 
distractor congruency effect was greater under high working memory load (MRT 
difference between congruent and incongruent distractor conditions =104 ms) than 
low working memory load (MRT difference = 56 ms), t (8) = 2.81, S E M =  17.22,/? 
= .023, but in the high perceptual load condition the distractor congruency effect in 
the high and low working memory load conditions was not significantly different 
(high working memory load M RT difference = 5 ms, low working memory load M  
RT difference =18 ms), t  <  1.
Since there was a main effect of working memory load on mean search RT, 
i.e., it was longer with high working memory load than low, it could be argued that 
the larger interference effect in the high working memory load condition was 
merely a side effect of the longer RT. However, when the ANOVA was repeated 
on the percentage increase in mean RT (i.e., (incongruent -  congruent) / 
congruent), the interaction of perceptual and working memory load remained 
significant: there was a larger difference in percentage congruency effect between 
memory load conditions in the low perceptual load condition (M = 14.5% under 
high working memory load and 7.6% under low, giving a mean difference of 6.9%) 
than in the high perceptual load condition (M = 0.1% under high working memory 
load and 2% under low, giving a mean difference of 1.9%), F ( 1, 15) = 6.73, M SE  = 
24.15,/? = .020, rjp2 = .31.
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The same analysis of variance model was used to analyse error rate. There 
was no main effect of perceptual load, F(1, 15) = 1.30, M SE  = 125.42, p  = .273, riP2 
= .08, no main effect of working memory load, F <  1, and no interaction between 
them, F <  1. There was a significant main effect of distractor congruency: 
incongruent distractors produced more errors than congruent distractors (M  =
13.1% and 9.6%, respectively), as would be expected, F ( \ ,  15) = 11.28, M SE  =  
18.12,/? = .004, rjp2 = .43, and there was no interaction between perceptual load and 
distractor congruency, nor was there between working memory load and distractor 
congruency, both F <  1. Finally, although the three way interaction did not reach 
significance, the pattern of results was in line with those for mean RT: in the low 
perceptual load condition the distractor congruency effect was larger under high 
working memory load (M =  6.3%) than low (M =  2.6%), whereas in the high 
perceptual load condition the distractor congruency effect was comparable under 
high (M =  1.6%) and low (M =  3.4%) working memory load, F ( 1, 15) = 2.19, M SE  
= 14.75,/? = 0.159, t |p2 = .13.
C S D etection. Trials in which either the search response or the working 
memory response were incorrect were excluded from the analysis. Mean 
percentage detection and false alarm rates and mean d ’ and P as a function of 
perceptual load and working memory load are presented in Table 17.
These data were entered into three separate two way mixed model ANOVA 
with perceptual load as a between-subjects factor and working memory load as a 
within-subjects factor - one analysis for detection rate, one for d \  and one for p. As 
can be seen in Table 17, detection rate and d ’ were lower in the high perceptual 
load condition than in the low perceptual load condition, F ( 1, 15) = 5.20, M SE  =  
393.18,/? = .038, rip2 = .26 for detection rate, F ( l ,  15) = 13.18, M SE  =  1 .8 7 ,p  =
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.002, rjp2 = .47 for d \  replicating the effect of perceptual load reported in the 
previous chapters.
Table 17. Mean (and SD) Percentage Detection and False Alarm Rates and Mean (and SD) d ’ and p 
as a Function of Perceptual Load and Working Memory Load in Experiment 16.
Working memory load
Low High Low High Low High Low High
Perceptual
load
Detection rate
%
False alarm 
rate % d ’ P
Low 92.1(12.9)
91.4
(10.4)
1.9
(2.3)
1.8
(2.1)
3.85
(0.95)
3.75
(0.92)
2.19
(1.94)
2.62
(1.78)
High 77.0(12.8)
75.5
(20.8)
16.6
(22.9)
20.0
(23.3)
2.17
(1.09)
2.02
(1.08)
4.04
(3.35)
3.17
(4.38)
However, detection rate and d ’ were no different in the high and low 
working memory load conditions, F  < 1 for both measures. There was also no 
interaction between perceptual load and working memory load for detection rate or 
d \  bo thF <  1.
P was not significantly different between the low and high perceptual load 
conditions, nor was it between the low and high working memory load conditions, 
both F  < 1. The interaction between perceptual load and working memory load on 
P was also not significant, F (l, 15) = 1.29, M SE  = 2.81, p  = .273, riP2 = .08.
Note that the null effect of working memory load in the high perceptual 
load condition occurred even though detection rate and d ’ were not at ceiling as 
they were in the low perceptual load condition of this experiment, and in the 
previous experiment (which was exclusively low perceptual load). Thus, both 
Experiments 15 and 16 have demonstrated that detection is unaffected by working 
memory load, even when, in the high perceptual load condition of Experiment 16, 
detection performance is off the ceiling.
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6.3 Chapter Conclusions
Whereas perceptual load significantly modulated detection rate and sensitivity, as it 
did in the experiments in the previous chapters, working memory load had no 
effect on detection in the experiments reported here; however, within the same 
experiment (Experiment 16), the previously reported finding that working memory 
load increases distractor interference effects on RTs (Lavie, 2000; Lavie et al., 
2004; Lavie & De Fockert, 2005) was replicated in the low perceptual load 
condition, but not in the high perceptual load condition. Why this occurred is not 
clear; however, it is possible that search task responses were not made as quickly as 
possible in the high perceptual load condition for the modulation of distractor 
effects by working memory load to be revealed, which may have been the result of 
participants undertaking the high perceptual load version of the experiment easing 
off a little in the less highly demanding dual-task response competition blocks, in 
between the intense triple task detection blocks (working memory task, search task, 
and detection task). Participants in the low perceptual load condition may not have 
suffered as much in the triple task detection blocks as their high perceptual load 
counterparts, since the low load search task was very easy, and hence search RTs 
were speeded enough to show an effect of working memory load in the low 
perceptual load condition. Nevertheless, since the modulation of distractor 
interference effects by working memory load shown previously was not replicated 
with a high perceptual load search task, whether working memory load was 
actually manipulated in the high perceptual load condition is brought into question, 
although working memory task RTs and error rates were higher under high 
working memory load than low. Since under conditions of low perceptual load
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detection performance was close to ceiling, it remains theoretically possible that 
detection of task-unrelated stimuli can be modulated by working memory load.
Taken at face value, the results of the experiments in this chapter suggest 
that the effect of perceptual load on detection is unique and specific to perceptual 
load, since increasing working memory load (in as far as working memory task 
RTs and error rates were significantly higher under high working memory load 
than low) during performance of the search and detection tasks did not have an 
effect on detection rate or sensitivity. This finding rules out an account of the 
effects of perceptual load in terms of an increase in the demand on general 
cognitive capacity resources. Furthermore, the contrast between this finding and 
those of previous studies, that working memory load increases distractor-related 
neural activity and interference effects on behaviour (Lavie, 2000; Lavie et al., 
2004; Lavie & De Fockert, 2005), potentially allows a more detailed understanding 
of the role working memory serves in the control of selective attention: only in 
situations in which task-irrelevant stimuli compete with the target for response 
selection will active executive control of selective attention (and hence working 
memory) be needed to minimize the processing of such distracting stimuli. 
Therefore, in such situations, rendering executive control unavailable by loading 
working memory results in greater distractor processing. On the other hand, when 
task-irrelevant stimuli do not compete with the target for response selection, and 
therefore can not produce interference, executive control is not required and the 
processing of such stimuli is unaffected by the level of load on executive control 
functions such as working memory.
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Chapter 7
General Discussion
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7.1 Overview of Findings
The experiments presented in this thesis have demonstrated the effect of perceptual 
load on conscious awareness. The rate and sensitivity (d  ’) of detection of a task- 
unrelated stimulus were reduced under high perceptual load compared to low 
perceptual load, indicating that participants were less likely to be aware of the 
stimulus when performing a task of high load. I have termed this phenomenon 
Toad induced blindness’. The effect was shown to not be due to differences in 
response criterion, search RTs, memory, goal-neglect, strategy, task difficulty or 
demand on general cognitive resources, but was indeed specifically due to load on 
perceptual processes. The effect extended to stimuli located at fixation as well as 
those in the periphery, although awareness was more likely for stimuli at fixation. 
In addition, a dissociation was found between the effects on conscious awareness 
of perceptual load and working memory load. Whereas perceptual load decreased 
awareness, working memory load had no effect on awareness. Although there have 
been many previous perceptual load studies, these experiments are the first to 
establish the effect of perceptual load on detection sensitivity.
7.1.1 Relation to Perceptual Load Research
The results provide the most compelling evidence so far that perceptual load 
modulates conscious awareness, and further considerably the resolution offered by 
the perceptual load theory for the early versus late selection debate. Specifically, 
the theory proposes that the demand on attention imposed by a task determines 
whether perception of task-unrelated information will occur: in situations of low 
perceptual load, task-unrelated stimuli are readily perceived since spare capacity 
‘spills over’ to include them; in situations of high perceptual load they are not
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perceived since attentional capacity is consumed by the task stimuli, leaving none 
remaining to process any further information.
As discussed in the General Introduction, previous evidence for perceptual 
load theory has almost exclusively come from experiments employing indirect 
measures of perception, such as the degree to which distractors interfere with target 
RTs and error rates (e.g., Beck & Lavie, 2005; Jenkins et al., 2005; Lavie, 1995; 
2000; Lavie & Cox, 1997; Lavie & Fox, 2000; Lavie, Ro, & Russell, 2003; 
Theeuwes et al., 2004), or the level of neural activity they elicit in visual cortex 
(e.g., Bahrami et al., 2007; O’Connor et al., 2002; Pessoa et al., 2002; Pinsk et al., 
2003; Rees et al., 1997,1999; Schwartz et al., 2005; Yi et al., 2004). No research 
has ever explicitly addressed the effects of perceptual load on conscious awareness, 
with one exception: Cartwright-Finch and Lavie (2007) assessed awareness reports 
using the inattentional blindness paradigm. Their results are therefore confined to 
the case of unexpected stimuli, and may have involved memory failure rather than 
conscious perception, as I discuss below. The findings of this thesis, however, fully 
support the prediction that perceptual load modulates conscious awareness of task- 
unrelated stimuli, and serve to further the resolution of the early and late selection 
debate by the perceptual load model.
7.1.2 Relation to Inattentional Blindness Research
Much previous research has attempted to show that a lack of attention leads to a 
lack of conscious awareness of task-unrelated stimuli: some presented an extra, 
unexpected object briefly with the task stimuli (while participants’ attention was 
focused on the task), i.e., inattentional blindness (for example, Cartwright-Finch & 
Lavie, 2007; Downing et al., 2004; Mack & Rock, 1998; Newby & Rock, 1998).
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Others presented a moving unexpected object during a long-presentation dynamic 
display of task stimuli, i.e., sustained inattentional blindness (for example, Most et 
al., 2000, 2001, 2005; Neisser & Becklen, 1975; Simons & Chabris, 1999). In both 
paradigms, after completing the critical trial, participants were asked if they had 
noticed anything extra in the display besides the task stimuli. Many participants 
failed to report the presence of the extra stimulus, even though they did notice it 
later when they did not have to perform a task, suggesting that the extra stimulus 
had not entered into their conscious awareness because their attention had been 
focused on the task, i.e., their attention had been elsewhere.
The extra stimulus, however, was always unexpected in the critical trial and 
expected in the later control trial: hence it was not possible to disentangle the effect 
of not attending to it from the effect of not expecting it. Braun (2001) has 
suggested that a failure to expect or anticipate the presence of a supra-threshold 
stimulus (such as that used in the inattentional blindness paradigm) could lead to 
blindness of that stimulus, in the same way that near-threshold stimuli in 
psychophysical experiments typically require a degree of familiarity to be 
consciously perceived -  sometimes hundreds of trials. The comparison of the 
critical and control trials in inattentional blindness experiments therefore confounds 
attention with expectation. In some studies, however, a comparison was made 
between different conditions in the critical trial, rather than between the critical and 
control trials (e.g., low and high perceptual load in Cartwright-Finch & Lavie,
2007; CS to target similarity in Most et al., 2001). In such cases attention is not 
confounded with expectation, but the results are limited to the case of awareness of 
unexpected stimuli. The methodology I have used here, however, precludes 
expectation as a confound, and does not limit the results to the case of unexpected
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stimuli, since the participants anticipated the appearance of the CS during the 
experiment.
Another confound of inattentional blindness is memory failure, or 
‘inattentional amnesia’ as Wolfe (1999) has termed it. The presence of the extra 
stimulus in the critical trial may have been forgotten rather than not perceived, 
since the response as to whether it had been consciously perceived or not came a 
short while after presentation -  after consideration of a task and making a response 
to that task, and also after the unexpected questioning that would have caused 
surprise and required verbal processing - all of which could have strongly affected 
the participants’ ability to remember the presence of the extra stimulus. As Wolfe 
(1999) has pointed out, a commonality of inattentional blindness experiments is 
that questioning about the extra stimulus occurs some time after the visual 
representation and iconic memory of the stimulus has dissipated. He suggests that 
attention is the gateway to memory rather than perception, and therefore unattended 
stimuli may well be perceived, but will be instantly forgotten, hence ‘inattentional 
amnesia’.
An alternative account of inattentional blindness in terms of memory failure 
has been proposed by Moore (2001; Moore & Egeth, 1997): the participants may 
have perceived the extra stimulus but not encoded it into memory. In a similar vein 
to Wolfe (1999), Moore suggests that while a subset of perceptual processes are 
engaged by unattended stimuli, the outputs of those processes require attention to 
be encoded into memory for subsequent report.
The methodology I have employed goes a considerable way to countering 
memory failure accounts, since there was no unexpected question causing surprise 
and requiring verbal processing of the question itself, and therefore the delay
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between task response and detection response was shorter than in inattentional 
blindness experiments. However, in only one experiment was the detection 
response made immediately after CS presentation and was there no intervening 
search response to be made first (Experiment 4). The effect of perceptual load was 
not significantly reduced in this experiment, and furthermore, overall detection rate 
was no better than previously, suggesting that there is no memory component to the 
effect of perceptual load on conscious awareness. Given that detection responses 
were made immediately in Experiment 4, an ‘inattentional amnesia’ account of 
load induced blindness can be ruled out: unlike with inattentional blindness 
experiments, participants would have been able to make a decision about the 
presence or absence of the CS during the presentation of the actual stimulus and the 
associated representation in iconic memory. An account in terms of the CS being 
perceived but not being encoded into memory can also be precluded: if a 
participant could not report the presence of the CS upon presentation, they must 
have not been consciously aware of it at the very moment it was reflected onto the 
retina. It must be noted, however, that manipulations employed in later experiments 
intended to raise the priority of the detection task, such as increasing the frequency 
of CS presentation (Experiments 5 and 7), requiring that a response is made when 
the CS is absent as well as present (Experiments 6 and 7), and increasing the 
location certainty of the CS (Experiment 8), were not implemented in Experiment 4 
in addition to the reversal of the order of responses. This manipulation was also 
intended to raise the priority of the detection task, as well as allow the detection 
response to be made immediately upon CS presentation; however, since these other 
manipulations were not implemented in Experiment 4, it is possible that the priority 
of the detection task remained low in this experiment, and this could account for
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the difference in detection performance between conditions rather than perceptual 
load. If this were the case, the results of later experiments in which the priority of 
the detection task was raised but the order of responses reverted to the detection 
response coming after the search response could still be explained by the 
inattentional amnesia hypothesis. Since there was no reduction in the size of the 
effect of perceptual load when the aforementioned manipulations designed to raise 
detection priority were implemented, however, there is no reason to suppose that 
low detection priority was at work in Experiment 4.
A further advantage of the experimental design I have used over the typical 
inattentional blindness paradigm is that changes in detection sensitivity could be 
compared to changes in response criterion. In all of the experiments reported, 
response criterion did not vary across conditions of perceptual load and so could 
also be ruled out as a confound or even as a component of the effect.
7.1.3 Differences In Search RT
In many previous perceptual load studies showing reduced distractor effects under 
high perceptual load compared to low, high load search RTs were longer than low 
load search RTs (Lavie, 1995; Lavie & Cox, 1997). An account of these results in 
terms of a dissipation of distractor effects within the longer high perceptual load 
RTs is possible, although this argument is countered by the fact that manipulations 
that increase task difficulty, and consequently RTs, without increasing perceptual 
load, e.g., working memory load (Lavie, 2000; Lavie et al., 2004), or stimulus 
degradation (Lavie & De Fockert, 2003), produce an increase in distractor effects 
rather than a decrease. Although in this thesis perception was assessed via a 
measure of detection rather than effects on target RTs, it was nevertheless
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important to rule out an account of the effect of perceptual load on detection 
sensitivity in terms of the slower high load search RTs. The experiments in Chapter 
2 have excluded such an account by replicating the results with designs in which 
the interval between the search response and the detection response was made 
equal (Experiment 2), and in which search responses were delayed so that mean 
search RT was the same in the two conditions of load (Experiment 3).
7.1.4 Detection Priority
In Chapter 3, the effect of perceptual load on awareness persisted with four 
different manipulations designed to raise the priority of the detection task, thereby 
ruling out goal-neglect type accounts of the results. The degree to which detection 
sensitivity was reduced by high perceptual load remained the same, even though 
response criterion became lower (i.e., there was an increase in present responses - 
both hits and false alarms).
Given that the manipulations employed in Chapter 3 affected the way 
participants responded to the detection task (i.e., by lowering response criterion), it 
is clear that these manipulations did produce the desired effect: the priority of 
detection was increased. It is impossible to know without further experimentation, 
however, whether detection could have been prioritised any further, for example, 
by providing feedback for errors of detection. If so, it is still possible that the effect 
of perceptual load on detection sensitivity may at least in part be due to the 
detection task being of lower priority in the high perceptual load condition than low 
perceptual load condition.
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7.1.5 Strategy
Several previous perceptual load studies have ruled out differential search task 
strategies as a confound by replicating the effect of perceptual load with a design in 
which trials of different levels of load are presented in a randomly intermixed 
order, so that the level of perceptual load in a trial could not be known in advance 
(Lavie & Cox, 1997, and Theeuwes et al., 2004, using the response competition 
paradigm; Cartwright-Finch & Lavie, 2007, using the inattentional blindness 
paradigm). In the same way, the experiments in Chapter 4 ruled out a strategy 
based account of the results using a design with randomly intermixed load trials. 
However, the difference in detection sensitivity between perceptual load conditions 
in these experiments was reduced, suggesting that there may have been a strategy 
component to the effect. Reducing the probability of CS presentation (Experiment 
11) did not alleviate this weakening of the perceptual load effect.
It is puzzling, however, that the reduction in the effect of perceptual load 
was as much the result of poorer detection sensitivity in the low load compared to 
previous experiments, as it was the result o f improved detection sensitivity in the 
high load. Because of this, it is unlikely that a low perceptual load strategy or a 
high perceptual load strategy was adopted for both conditions of load in the 
intermixed experiments -  more likely that an intermediate strategy was employed 
that yielded detection sensitivity somewhere between the previous levels in the low 
and high perceptual load conditions. Alternatively, since the reduction of detection 
sensitivity in the low load in the intermixed design was entirely due to an increase 
in false alarms (detection rate was no lower than in the blocked design), perhaps 
the experience of guessing that the CS had been present in the high load led to 
more guessing in the low load than had occurred previously.
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Although this thesis does not rule out a strategy component of the effect of 
perceptual load on conscious awareness, clearly strategy could not account for the 
whole effect, as it persisted with an intermixed design. Future experiments, 
however, may find that the effect of perceptual load disappears if an intermixed 
design is combined with further manipulations designed to increase the priority of 
detection (i.e., if in addition to increasing CS frequency and requiring 
present/absent detection responses, the order of search and detection responses is 
reversed, or the location certainty of the CS is increased).
7.1.6 Load Induced Blindness at Fixation
The experiments in this thesis have demonstrated that detection of a task-unrelated 
stimulus located directly at the point of fixation is modulated by perceptual load, 
but is superior to detection of a stimulus located in the periphery (Chapter 5). The 
first finding illustrates the pervasiveness of the effect of perceptual load on 
conscious awareness across the retina: both foveal and peripheral objects can be 
overlooked. The second finding adds to previous research showing that 
performance on perceptual tasks is superior for stimuli presented at fixation than in 
the periphery, for example, with letters (Anstis, 1974), vernier offsets (Weymouth, 
1958), and gratings (Rovamo, Virsu, & Nasanen, 1978; Virsu & Rovamu, 1979). In 
every case, however, performance was equated across the visual field by scaling 
the sizes of the stimuli according to the cortical magnification factor (e.g., Cowey 
& Rolls, 1974; Rovamo & Virsu, 1979). Since equating visibility by size-scaling 
eliminates the effect of eccentricity, such findings are explained in terms of the 
considerable physiological superiority of the fovea. However, a foveal advantage 
despite size-scaling of stimuli was demonstrated in the experiments reported in this
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thesis, in line with Wolfe et al. (1998), who found an eccentricity effect with scaled 
stimuli in a visual search paradigm, such that targets closer to fixation were 
identified more rapidly than those at further eccentricities, and with Beck and Lavie 
(2005), who showed that fixated distractors exerted greater interference effects than 
those in the periphery, with a response competition paradigm using scaled 
distractor letters. This thesis therefore extrapolates non-visibility based eccentricity 
effects to include conscious awareness as well as search performance and distractor 
interference.
The finding that stimuli at fixation are more likely to reach awareness than 
stimuli in the periphery, together with the work of Wolfe et al. (1998) and Beck 
and Lavie (2005) suggests that over and above the well-documented perceptual 
superiority of the fovea, there is a greater attentional weight for objects located 
there. This prioritisation of the processing of foveal stimuli over stimuli located 
elsewhere on the retina results in those stimuli being identified more quickly and 
accurately, being more capable of causing distraction, and being more likely to 
enter conscious awareness, as has been shown in this thesis.
Such an assertion stands in direct opposition to Mack and Rock’s (1998) 
conclusion that there is greater inhibition of fixated stimuli than peripheral stimuli. 
This was based on research showing more frequent inattentional blindness for 
stimuli at fixation (Mack & Rock, 1998). However, as I suggested in the 
introduction to Chapter 5, Mack and Rock’s methodology confounded task 
demands with stimulus location (as did Goolkasian’s, 1999), whereas with the 
experiments in this thesis the task demands were identical across CS location 
conditions. However, given that in Mack and Rock’s (1998) experiments the CS 
was unexpected, whereas here the CS was always expected, it remains possible that
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there is greater inhibition of unexpected stimuli at fixation and greater awareness of 
expected stimuli at fixation. Future research should examine this possibility by 
reassessing inattentional blindness at fixation and in the periphery, while ensuring 
that task demands are equal across CS location conditions.
7.1.7 Working Memory Load
The findings of this thesis suggest two dissociations: one between the effects of 
perceptual load and working memory load on conscious awareness; the other 
between the effect of working memory load on awareness and on distractor 
interference effects on target RTs (Chapter 6).
Several previous studies have documented that loading working memory 
produces the opposite effect to loading the perceptual system, i.e., distractor 
interference effects are increased rather than eliminated. This effect has been 
shown with a response competition paradigm (De Fockert, Rees, Frith, & Lavie, 
2001; Lavie, 2000; Lavie, Hirst, De Fockert, & Viding, 2004) and an attentional 
capture paradigm (Lavie & De Fockert, 2005), and furthermore, neural activity 
related to distractor processing has been shown to be greater under conditions of 
high working memory load than low (De Fockert et al., 2001). However, no such 
effect of working memory was found on detection rate or detection sensitivity in 
the experiments reported in Chapter 6, although the increase in distractor 
interference effects under high working memory load reported previously was only 
replicated in the low perceptual load condition and not in the high perceptual load 
condition, rendering the null effect of working memory load in the high perceptual 
load condition, in which detection performance was off-ceiling, somewhat 
questionable.
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Nevertheless, these findings are important in two respects. Firstly, the 
disparity between the effect of perceptual load and the null effect of working 
memory load rules out an alternative interpretation of the reduction of detection 
sensitivity under high perceptual load in terms of simple task difficulty, and 
strengthens the claim that the effect of perceptual load on conscious awareness is 
specifically due to increased demand on attentional capacity, rather than increased 
demand on some general cognitive capacity resource. This specificity is consistent 
with a previous demonstration (Lavie & De Fockert, 2003) that a source of task 
difficulty other than perceptual load does not produce the same effect: degrading 
the appearance of the target stimulus increased task difficulty and resulted in an 
increase in distractor effects, whereas perceptual load increased task difficulty but 
decreased distractor effects. Lavie and De Fockert’s (2003) study, however, 
assessed the perception of distractors via response competition; this thesis therefore 
extrapolates the finding that perceptual load has a specific effect among sources of 
task difficulty, to direct measures of awareness.
Secondly, the contrast between these results showing that conscious 
awareness of a task-irrelevant stimulus is unaffected by working memory load, and 
the previous finding that working memory load increases distractor interference 
effects on RTs (De Fockert et al., 2001; Lavie, 2000; Lavie et al., 2004), potentially 
provides an important clarification of the role working memory serves in the 
control of selective attention. The task-irrelevant stimulus used here was a low- 
contrast meaningless shape that evidently would not compete with the search target 
for selection, since it was unrelated to the search task responses and was less 
visually salient than the target. By contrast, increased distractor interference with 
high working memory load has been found here and in previous studies (De
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Fockert et al., 2001; Lavie, 2000; Lavie & De Fockert, 2005; Lavie et al., 2004) 
with distractor stimuli that were strong competitors for target selection, either 
because they were response-related (i.e., congruent or incongruent with the task 
response, as in this thesis and in Lavie, 2000, and Lavie et al., 2004) or because 
they were more salient than the target (i.e., in the attentional capture paradigm used 
by Lavie and De Fockert (2005), the distractor was a colour singleton presented 
during a shape search task), or in some cases both (e.g., De Fockert et al., 2001, 
used distractor faces that were not only related to the task response, but were also 
likely to have been more salient than the word targets). As such, the contrast 
between the effects of working memory load on these different types of task- 
unrelated stimuli suggests that active executive control of selective attention by 
working memory is only needed in competitive situations: when task-unrelated 
stimuli compete with the target for attention (if they are particularly salient) or for 
response selection (if they are response-related), or both, active executive control 
of selective attention is engaged in order to inhibit the processing of such stimuli. 
Hence, loading working memory results in increased interference since executive 
control is no longer able to manage selective attention as effectively. Conversely, 
the processing of task-unrelated stimuli that do not compete with the target for 
selection is unaffected by working memory load, since executive control processes 
are not required to prevent them from causing interference in the first place.
This interpretation accommodates previous findings that the neural activity 
related to task-irrelevant stimuli is affected by perceptual load but not by working 
memory load (e.g., Yi, Woodman, Widders, Marois, & Chun, 2004). In this study, 
the task-irrelevant stimuli (images of places presented in the background) were 
unrelated to the task responses concerning the identity of a face in the centre of the
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display. As such, they would not have competed with the target for selection, hence 
active executive control would not have been required to reduce the extent to which 
they were processed. Loading working memory would therefore have no effect.
A different explanation of the dissociation between the effect of working 
memory load on awareness and on distractor effects, is that the effect of working 
memory load may occur too late to affect awareness: the increase in distractor 
interference could reflect effects on later response selection processes rather than 
on perception per se. De Fockert et al.’s (2001) data may appear at first sight to be 
inconsistent with this interpretation, in that the increase in neural activity in the 
fusiform face area related to the presence of face distractors under high load 
compared to low load seems to imply greater perception; however, the increase in 
neural activity could reflect response-selection processes or a greater activation of 
the face category of objects rather than increased perception of the particular face 
distractor.
Finally, it is important to note that the manipulation of working memory 
load via the active maintenance of digits in memory employed in this thesis, as well 
as in the previous working memory load and distractibility studies by Lavie and 
colleagues, would not have involved any load on visual short-term memory, since 
active maintenance of verbal material is mediated by phonological rehearsal 
(Conrad, 1964; Posner & Keele, 1967). Visual short-term memory involves a 
passive form of maintenance that does not draw on active executive control 
(Baddeley, 1986). Indeed, high visual short-term memory load has recently been 
found to reduce conscious awareness (Todd, Fougnie, & Marois, 2005). This 
finding is in line with the notion that representations in visual short-term memory 
are analogous to visual perception, leading to the prediction that the effect of visual
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short-term memory load would be similar to that of perceptual load. This prediction 
could be tested with the methodology used in this thesis by manipulating visual 
short-term memory load and measuring detection sensitivity of the task-unrelated 
stimulus.
7.1.8 Capacity Limits
The principal finding of this thesis, that the detection sensitivity of task-unrelated 
stimuli is reduced under conditions of high perceptual load, contradicts the 
traditional view that early perceptual processes such as detection are capacity-free, 
and hence do not depend on the allocation of attention (Bonnel, Stein, & Bertucci, 
1992; Braun & Sagi, 1990; 1991; Posner & Boies, 1971; Shaw, 1984).
Bonnel, Stein, and Bertucci (1992) claimed that whereas a perceptual 
discrimination (e.g., between a luminance increment and decrement) depends on 
the allocation of attention, detection (e.g., of a luminance increment) is an 
automatic process in the sense that it is capacity-free. However, Bonnel and 
colleagues’ study compared the effects of instructions to allocate attention 
differentially between two stimuli (e.g., 80% to one source of light and 20% to 
another) and did not address the effects of perceptual load on attention as I have in 
this thesis.
Somewhat more relevant are the findings from experiments that assessed 
the effects of attention on detection by comparing performance in single and dual­
task conditions. In a series of studies, Braun and Sagi (1990; 1991, see also Sagi & 
Julesz, 1985a; 1985b) found that detection of an oddball that forms a texture break 
in a homogenous background (i.e., a vertical line among tilted lines), did not show 
a performance decrement under dual-task conditions (in which the detection task
143
was combined with a central task requiring the discrimination of the orientation of 
a stimulus). When the detection task was replaced with a second discrimination 
task of stimuli in the background, however, performance of this task did suffer. 
Braun and Sagi (1990) therefore concluded, similarly to Bonnel et al. (1992), that 
whereas perceptual discrimination depends on the allocation of attention, detection 
of an element that forms a texture break does not.
This conclusion was contested, however, by Joseph, Chun, and Nakayama 
(1997), who replicated Braun and Sagi’s (1991) findings, i.e., the lack of a 
detection performance decrement in dual-task conditions, with a task involving 
detection of an oddball line (e.g., a line tilted at 45° among other lines tilted at 
315°), and a central task involving an orientation discrimination, but found that 
detection did suffer from a dual-task decrement when combined with a demanding 
RSVP letter task rather than the orientation discrimination task. These results 
mirror those presented in this thesis, in that only a demanding task of high 
perceptual load produced a decrement in detection performance. It is clear, 
therefore, that a greater demand on attention can result in reduced detection 
performance in line with perceptual load theory and the findings of this thesis. The 
conclusion drawn from Joseph et al.’s (1997) study, however, is confined to the 
comparison of detection performance in single and dual-task conditions. It is 
important to note that such conditions differ not only in the level of load on 
attention, but also in terms of the logistics involved in performing two tasks 
simultaneously. Such a comparison is therefore confounded by non-attentional 
processes such as making an additional response (in the dual-task condition), 
memory (due to the delay caused by the need to make one task response before the 
other in the dual-task condition) and goal-neglect (due to performing two tasks
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simultaneously in the dual-task condition). By contrast, the experiments presented 
in this thesis involve a task that remains the same in all respects other than the 
perceptual load of the search task, and demonstrate that the level of load on 
attention, as distinct from any effects of memory, goal-neglect, response criterion, 
strategy or task difficulty, can determine the simple ability to detect the presence of 
a stimulus. This research, therefore, not only elucidates the role of perceptual load 
in conscious awareness, but also resolves the important issue of whether early 
perceptual processing, involving mere stimulus detection, is subject to capacity 
limits.
7.2 Further Research
There are several directions for further research that arise directly from the results 
presented in this thesis.
7.2.1 Different Load Manipulations
Perceptual load was always manipulated in the same way in this thesis. This 
method involved increasing load by adding non-target stimuli to a search task that 
remained the same in both low and high load conditions. Perceptual load could also 
be manipulated by requiring different tasks to be performed with the same stimuli, 
for example, with an RSVP stream on which a single feature (low load) or 
conjunction of features (high load) search task can be performed (e.g., Schwartz et 
al., 2005). Alternatively, the cross task of Cartwright-Finch and Lavie (2007) could 
be used, in which participants are asked either to determine which cross arm is blue 
(low load), or determine which cross arm is longer (high load), with the same cross
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stimulus. A replication of load induced blindness with either of these manipulations 
would demonstrate the generality of the effect of perceptual load on awareness.
7.2.2 Type of Stimulus
To some extent, load induced blindness may depend on the type of task-unrelated 
stimulus presented. The image of a face, for example, may always enter conscious 
awareness irrespective of the level of perceptual load of the task. This proposition 
stems from recent suggestions that faces are prioritised for processing over other 
objects and may even be perceived automatically (Austen & Enns, 2000; Downing, 
Bray, Rogers, & Childs, 2004; Jenkins, Lavie, & Driver, 2003; Ro, Russell, & 
Lavie, 2001). Other types of meaningful stimuli may also automatically enter 
awareness: emotional pictures, words, or the participant’s name, for example. 
Future research could investigate such claims.
The experiments reported here examined the conscious awareness of task- 
unrelated stimuli in static displays. A further test of the effect of perceptual load on 
conscious awareness could be with dynamic displays. A lack of awareness of 
moving stimuli in dynamic displays has already been demonstrated with the 
sustained inattentional blindness paradigm (e.g., Most et al., 2000, 2001, 2005; 
Simons & Chabris, 1999). Such experiments are, however, susceptible to 
confounds in terms of expectation and memory. A demonstration of load induced 
blindness with dynamic displays would therefore be more conclusive.
7.2.3 Unconscious Processing of the CS
When the appearance of the CS does not enter conscious awareness in the high 
perceptual load condition, it may nevertheless produce effects on behaviour due to
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unconscious processing. Such effects may be detectable by indirect measures. 
Previous perceptual load studies using indirect measures have shown that distractor 
effects are reduced under high perceptual load (e.g., Lavie, 1995); however, this 
only tells us that the identity of the distractor was not processed, it does not tell us 
that participants were not consciously aware of the presence of the distractor. 
Indeed, there may be measurable effects associated with the mere presence of a 
distractor (like a filtering cost, as per Treisman, Kahneman, & Burkell, 1983) rather 
than its identity, that would remain observable under high perceptual load 
(although Forster and Lavie [2008] showed that the RT decrement associated with 
the presence of an additional stimulus was reduced under high perceptual load; 
however, they did not produce evidence that the participants were not consciously 
aware of the distractor). In the same way, the CS may produce a slight slowing of 
search RT, even when it does not enter conscious awareness. It was not feasible to 
assess such a claim in this thesis due to an insufficient number of critical trials. A 
future experiment would have to involve a large number of critical trials in order to 
obtain reasonable measures of mean search RT when the CS was not presented and 
correctly rejected, and mean search RT when the CS was presented and missed.
7.2.4 Cross-Modal Load Induced Blindness
An ongoing debate concerns whether attentional resources are pooled across 
modalities or whether they are modality-specific (Allport, Antonis, & Reynolds, 
1972; Broadbent, 1958; Driver & Spence, 1998; Duncan, Martens, & Ward, 1997; 
McLeod, 1977b). It is therefore of theoretical interest to investigate whether load 
induced blindness can occur cross-modally. This could be achieved by measuring 
detection of a task-unrelated stimulus presented to one modality while increasing
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perceptual load in an alternate modality. For example, visual awareness could be 
assessed while increasing perceptual load in the auditory domain. Conversely, it 
may be possible to demonstrate load induced deafness due to high perceptual 
demand in a visual task. In principle, such experiments could involve any pairing 
of the five modalities.
7.3 Conclusion
In summary, this thesis has established the role of perceptual load in determining 
conscious awareness. The results support the hypothesis that conscious perception 
(including the mere detection of the presence of a stimulus) depends on the 
allocation of limited capacity attention, and that exhausting attention in a high 
perceptual load task reduces conscious awareness of task-unrelated stimuli, with 
the failures of detection leading to load induced blindness. The results create new 
avenues for research: some have been addressed in this thesis, e.g., comparing 
awareness at fixation versus in the periphery, or establishing the effect of working 
memory load on awareness, others may be addressed by future research.
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